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Abstract
by Zhicong Pan
The study on multi-channel problems has been one of the most active research
¯elds in recent years. In this paper, we consider a dual-channel network problem
with one manufacture and one retailer. The manufacturer, acting as the Stackelberg
leader, sells a single type of product through a traditional channel to the retailer
and/or through a direct channel to customers. The retailer, acting as the follower,
operates a Newsvendor model, ordering from the manufacturer and selling to the
customers. We study the problem with the deterministic demand.
We develop an e±cient algorithm to ¯nd the joint optimal policy for three prices:
the wholesale price, the retail price in the traditional channel and the selling price
in the direct channel. Our framework involves four di®erent operational scenarios:
the dual-channel scenario, the traditional-channel-only scenario, the direct-channel-
only scenario, and the "equal pricing" scenario in which the wholesale price is equal
to the selling price in the direct channel. We provide some criteria to identify
di®erent operational scenarios, and compare the performance of the four operational
scenarios through numerical analysis. The scenario using dual channel possesses
much more complementary e®ect between two channels than the performance in
the "equal pricing" scenario. This observation calibrates some arguments based on
the references only considering the "equal pricing" scenario. In addition, we have
also examined a vertically integrated ¯rm that operates a dual-channel supply chain.
This vertically integrated ¯rm is a centralized decision maker that decides two selling
prices for the dual channels simultaneously. We have also compared the performanceof the four scenarios with the performance of the integrated ¯rm through numerical
analysis.
We also consider stochastic demands for the dual-channel problem with one man-
ufacturer and one retailer. In addition to pricing decisions, the manufacturer and
the retailer also make inventory decisions (The retailer decides order quantity.) in
the stochastic-demand problem. In our model, we consider exogenous wholesale
price. There are four decision variables in our model: the retailer price, the direct
channel price, the production capacity of the manufacturer, and the order quantity
of retailer. We have developed a mechanism based on the chain rule to obtain the
solutions one by one for these four decision variables. Given the wholesale price and
the selling price in direct channel, we have obtained the retailer's order quantity and
the retail price in the traditional channel. We have also obtained the optimal inven-
tory capacity and the optimal direct price for the manufacturer given the retailer's
best response for its order quantity and retail price. we also describe the optimal
policy and compare the performance with regards to the retailer's order quantity
through numerical analysis. We ¯nd that the manufacturer's pro¯t is convex over
the retailer's safety stock (order quantity), which indicates that an unique optimal
wholesale price may not exist to maximize manufacturer's pro¯t.
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vChapter 1
Deterministic Case
1.1 Introduction
Companies use the Internet as a new avenue to directly sell products to their cus-
tomers. While the Internet provides an opportunity to increase sales by attracting
more customers, it could also be a threat to the existing, traditional channel. The
problem of introducing a new direct channel to customers so that the overall sales of
a company is increased is called the dual-channel problem. In this paper, we study
the dual-channel problem in the manufacturing industry.
Dual-channel distribution systems are widely used in various industries. Man-
ufacturers like Sony Ellectronics, Apple Computers, Dell, etc. sell products to the
consumers through independent retailers like Best Buy, Circuit City, etc. as well
as through their respective e-commerce web-site (direct channel). The sales volume
from the direct channel can be signi¯cant, especially when companies like Dell or
Apple are well-known to most customers and internet is accessible for more and
more consumers. More and more customers tend to buy their products from their
web-site not from the traditional store. For a company that operates two distribu-
tion channels, the ¯rst decision to make would be the "pricing" decision. That is,
what prices would be optimal for them to sell products through the two channels?
1CHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 2
Di®erent companies use di®erent pricing strategies. For example, a Dell Inspiron
1525 laptop can be obtained for 1050SGD at Dell's web-site. This price matches
exactly the non-sale price at Dell's traditional retailers such as Suntec City. In this
case, Dell prices its products in such a way that the direct channel price matches the
retail price, which means the price charged from customers who order products from
the direct channel, e.g. Dell's web-site, is the same as the retail price retailers charge
customers when customers order products from the retailer. We call this pricing
strategy 'Price Matching' strategy. 'Price Matching' strategy is often adopted by
many companies because it can alleviate channel con°icts when those companies
operate dual-channel supply chain.
Many companies operate a direct channel, 'not to obtain a larger share of the
channel pro¯t, but rather to induce the existing channel to expand sales volume and
pro¯ts to a more e±cient level' (Chiang (2003)). Aside from the 'Matching Pricing'
strategy, some companies price their products in such a way that the wholesale price
manufacturers charge retailers is equal to the online price or direct price. We call
such pricing strategy 'Equal Pricing' strategy. By using the 'Equal Pricing' strategy,
there may not be any sales occur in the direct channel. However, companies can still
get more pro¯ts because 'the direct channel indirectly increases the °ow of pro¯ts
through retail channel' (Chiang (2003)). These interesting results are obtained and
examined by Chiang in 2003.
The 'Matching Pricing' strategy and 'Equal Pricing' strategy can be e±cient
and useful when it comes to alleviating channel con°icts and expanding the existing
channel's sales volume and pro¯t. However, are the two pricing strategies always
optimal for the manufacturers? Will retailers and customers always favor those
pricing strategies? Except for the 'Matching Pricing' strategy and 'Equal Pricing'
strategy, are there some other pricing strategies that may be more e±cient under
some circumstances? This paper tries to answer such questions and come up with
some other pricing strategies that may be more favorable for manufacturers.CHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 3
Balasubramania(1998) did some early research on the dual-channel problem
through modeling "the competition in the multiple-channel environment from a
strategic viewpoint" and marked "the early attempt to analyze this issue" (direct
Versus retail competition). After Balasubramanian's early move on researching this
multiple-channel problem, a lot of papers regarding this area have been published.
Most of them are dealing with the "pricing" problem and the e®ects of direct mar-
keting on the manufacturer and the retailer (Chiang et al. 3003; Viswanathan 2005;
Swaminathan et al., 2006 and 2009).
In this paper, we solve such dual-channel problem in the manufacturing industry
with one manufacturer and one retailer considered. We use a stylish demand model
to solve the pricing problems facing manufacturers operating dual channels and
answer questions raised in the above. Our analysis characterizes the equilibrium of
the Stackelberg game where the manufacturer, as the leader in the game, knows the
pricing decision taken by the retailer and decides its wholesale price to the retailer
and direct price for the direct channel.
Our work contributes to the operations management literature by attempting to
solve the manufacturer's pricing problem and the retailer's pricing problem under
di®erent scenarios. We have also designed an e±cient algorithm for manufacturers
to use when they are selecting their pricing strategies. We have developed some
criteria under which it is optimal for the manufacturer to operates dual channels
or it is optimal for the manufacturer to operate only one channel, either traditional
channel or direct channel. Our results show that 'Equal Pricing' strategy and 'Match
Pricing' strategy may not always be optimal for manufacturers. In some cases, it
would be optimal for manufacturers price their products at a higher price in direct
channel than their wholesale price o®ered to retailers. In addition, most of the time,
it is optimal for manufacturers operate dual channels even when the direct channel
has become much more convenient than the retail channel, as long as there are
su±cient customers to buy from retailers.CHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 4
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a
review of the related literature. Section 1.3 presents problem analysis, assumptions
and our model. Section 1.4 presents solutions and analysis. Section 1.5 provides
some insights to the results, structure results and sensitivity analysis. Section 1.6
provides some numerical study to illustrate the di®erent channel strategies of the
manufacturer. Finally section 1.7 summarizes and concludes the paper.
1.2 Related literature
Multi-channel problem has been extensively researched in the literature. Some of
them focus on the pricing problem with competition, while some of them focus on
demand forecasting and mixed-channel strategy with value-adding retailer.
Balasubramanian (1998) analyzed the competition between direct marketers and
conventional retailers through using the spatial setting of the circular market, which
considered the role of information as a strategic lever in the multiple-channel mar-
ket. Direct sellers can regulate the level of consumer information and control the
competitive °avor of the market. Tsay et al. (1999) and Frazier (1999) survey chan-
nel structure and incentive design for performance enhancement, but not channel
con°ict. Rhee and Park (2000) study a hybrid channel design problem, assuming
that there are two consumer segments: a price sensitive segment and a service sen-
sitive segment. Chiang et al. (2003) examine a price-competition game in a dual
channel supply chain. Their results show that a direct channel strategy makes the
manufacturer more pro¯table by posing a viable threat to draw customers away
from the retailer, even though the equilibrium sales volume in the direct channel is
zero. Their results however depend on the assumption that customer's acceptance
of online channel is homogeneous.
Boyaci (2004) studies stocking decisions for both the manufacturer and retailer and
assumes that all the prices are exogenous and demand is stochastic. Tsay andCHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 5
Agrawal (2004) provide an excellent review of recent work in the area and exam-
ine di®erent ways to adjust the manufacturer-retailer relationship. Viswanathan
(2005) studies the competition across online, traditional and hybrid channels using
a variant of circular city model. His focus is on understanding the impact of dif-
ferences in channel °exibility, network externalities, and switching costs. Cattani
et al.(2006) study coordination of pricing on Internet and traditional channels by
modeling micro-level consumer behavior for demand generation. In their model, cus-
tomers are at a random physical distance from traditional retailers, and at a random
virtual distance from the direct marketer, independent of the physical distance. The
market then is segmented according to the utility each customer attains from either
the direct channel or the traditional channel. Customers are not excluded from a
speci¯c market; thus both markets have a chance to compete for all customers. Aus-
sadavut et al.(2006) studied a dual channel supply chain in which a manufacturer
sells to a retailer as well as to consumers directly. Consumers choose the purchase
channel based on price and service qualities. The manufacturer decides the price
of the direct channel and the retailer decides both price and order quantity. They
developed conditions under which manufacturer the manufacturer and the retailer
share the market in equilibrium. They also showed that the di®erence in marginal
costs of the two channels plays an important role in determining the existence of
dual channels in equilibrium.
Another two related papers are published in 2009 by Swaminathan et al.(2009) and
Hu et al. (2009). Swaminathan (2009) studied the optimal pricing strategies when
a product is sold on two channels. They provided theoretical bounds for the four
prevalent pricing strategies proposed in the paper. Hu et al. (2009) discussed the
revenue management for a service supply chain with two streams of customers, with
the supplier having limited capacity of a perishable product. Monotone properties
for the revenue functions and pricing strategies have been derived in this paper.
Our model di®ers from the prior studies in the following areas: (i) We focus onCHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 6
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Figure 1.1: Dual channels. A manufacturer sells its products to customers through
an retailer and through a direct channel. For each unit of product sold through the
retailer, the retailer charges the customer a price p1 and pays the manufacturer a
wholesale price w · p1. For each unit of product that is sold directly from the
manufacturer, the manufacturer charges the customer a direct price p2.
a stylish demand model to model the pricing problem for manufacturer and the
retailer. (ii) We study the optimal pricing decisions of the manufacturer and the
retailer under di®erent conditions. Contributions of our work include: we develop
optimal pricing strategy for the retailer and the manufacturer under di®erent con-
ditions and develop some interesting insights.
1.3 Assumptions and problem formulation
Consider a manufacturer that sells its products to customers through an retailer. For
each product that is sold through the retailer, the customer pays p1 to the retailer,
who in turn pays a wholesale price w · p1 to the manufacturer. Alternatively, the
manufacturer can sells its products to customers through a direct channel (such as
the manufacturer's web page) with a direct price p2. The goal of the manufacturer is
to maximize its own pro¯t from both channels by properly setting the prices w and
p2, while the goal of the retailer is to maximize his own pro¯t by properly choosing
the price p1. Figure 2.1 shows the dual channels of the manufacturer.
The problem can be further divided into two sub-problems: the retailer's problem
and the manufacturer's problem. Below, we ¯rst describe the retailer's problem and
its modeling. Then after that, we will describe the manufacturer's problem and its
modeling. In the following section, which is section 4, we will focus on the solutionsCHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 7
analysis. We list the notations used in this paper as below. where in table 1.1, i = 1
Table 1.1: Notations (in order of appearance)
Di demand function for channel i (i = 1;2)
ai base demand for channel i (i = 1;2)
bij price sensitivity coe±cients (i;j = 1;2)
pi retail price for channel i (i = 1;2)
w wholesale price for one unit of product
Vm manufacturer's pro¯t
Vr retailer's pro¯t
p1(p2;w) retailer's pricing decision as function of p2 and w
represents the traditional channel and i = 2 represents direct channel, respectively.
Notice that in the above notations, ai, bij and c are all non-negative.
1.3.1 Demand model and assumptions
Let p1 denote the retail price for one unit of product sold from the retailer to the
customer via the traditional channel. Let w denote the wholesale price for one unit
of product sold from the manufacturer to the retailer. Let p2 denote the direct price
for one unit of product sold from the manufacturer to the customer via the direct
channel.
Given that the prices are p1, p2, and w, we assume that the demand is deterministic
and only consider the cases that the demands are non-negative. De¯ne D1(p1;p2) and
D2(p1;p2) as the basic demand function for traditional channel and direct channel,
respectively. Then D1 and D2 are de¯ned as below (note that in following we use
D1 and D2 to represent D1(p1;p2) and D2(p1;p2) in future).
D1 = a1 ¡ b11p1 + b12p2 (1.1)
and similarly, D2 can be expressed as
D2 = a2 ¡ b22p2 + b21p1 (1.2)CHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 8
ai represent the market potential for each channel and both are positive, while bii
and bij represent the price and cross-price sensitivity parameters (i = 1;2 and i 6= j).
In general, both ai and bij are all positive. Notice that in the above de¯nition, D1
and D2 are basic demand functions. The actual demand functions are limited by the
boundary conditions. From the demand's de¯nitions and non-negativity condition,
we can obtain the upper bound for the retail price p1 and direct price p2, namely ¹ p1
and ¹ p2, as below.
¹ p1 =
a1b22 + a2b12
b22b11 ¡ b21b12
(1.3)
¹ p2 =
a2b11 + a1b21
b22b11 ¡ b21b12
(1.4)
We will discuss the problem with p1 and p2 within their upper bounds. We then
de¯ne the actual demand functions for the problem as below.
D1 =
8
> <
> :
a1 ¡ b11p1 + b12p2 ifp1 ·
a1+b12p2
b11 ;
0 otherwise:
D2 =
8
> <
> :
a2 ¡ b22p2 + b21p1 ifp1 ¸
b22p2¡a2
b21 ;
0 otherwise:
To keep the retailer from buying through the direct channel or other arbitrators
with a lower price, the wholesale price should not be higher than the direct channel
price, that is w · p2. We assume that the wholesale price is bounded and its upper
bound equals to the minimum of upper bound of the retailer's retail price and the
upper bound of the direct price.
Assumption 1.1. : (Price Constraint assumption) we assume that p1, p2, and
w are all non-negative and bounded. Let P1 = f0 · p1 · ¹ p1g;P2 = f0 · p2 ·CHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 9
¹ p2g;W = f0 · w · ¹ wg, then P1;P2;W denote the price ranges. Note that we de¯ne
¹ w = minf¹ p1; ¹ p2g. We call this assumption as Price Constraint assumption.
Assumption 1.2. : (Dominance assumption) the price and cross-price sensitivity
parameters have some relationships that are treated as common constraints in the
literatures.
bii ¸ bij; where i;j = 1;2(i 6= j): (1.5)
Assumption 1.2 says that demand for each product i is more sensitive to a change
in its own price than it is to a simultaneous change in the prices of all other products.
Assumption 1.2 is commonly used in the literature. (Horn and Johnson 1994; and
C. Maglaras and J. Meissner 2006)
1.3.2 Problem formulation
In this section, we model the retailer and the manufacturer problem individually,
while in the next section, we focus on the problem analysis and solutions.
Retailer's problem formulation. The retailer has only one decision variable to
control to maximize its pro¯t, i.e. the retail price p1. The pro¯t function Vr(w;p2)
represents the maximum expected pro¯t of retailer. De¯ne a function fr(p1) as
below
fr(p1) = (p1 ¡ w)D1(p1;p2)
= (p1 ¡ w)(a1 ¡ b11p1 + b12p2) (1.6)
Then we can obtain the retailer's maximum pro¯t
Vr(p2;w) = max
p1
©
fr(p1)
ª
(1.7)CHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 10
s.t. p1 ·
a1 + b12p2
b11
When solving the retailer's problem, we assume that p2 and w are ¯xed and known
to the retailer.
Manufacturer's problem formulation. There are two decision variables for the
manufacturer to control over to maximize its pro¯t, i.e. the direct price p2 and the
wholesale price w. Assuming that p1 is the retailer's best response given p2 and w,
then we can obtain Vm as the maximum expected pro¯t of manufacturer, which is
a function of p2 and w. Note that we assume the retailer and the manufacturer are
playing a Stackelberg game with the manufacturer acting the Stackelberg leader and
the retailer as follower. We de¯ne fm(p2;w) as below
fm(p2;w) = (w ¡ c)D1(p1;p2) + (p1 ¡ c)D2(p1;p2)
= (w ¡ c)(a1 ¡ b11p1 + b12p2) + (p1 ¡ c)(a2 ¡ b22p2 + b21p1) (1.8)
Note that in the above, we assume p1 is the retailer's best response given p2 and
w, which means p1 denotes p1(p2;w). Thus, fm(p2;w) is a quadratic function of p2
and w. Before de¯ning the manufacturer's problem, we ¯rst discuss the constraints
for manufacturer's problem. According to assumption 1.1, we have de¯ned that the
wholesale price w and direct price p2 are bounded and non-negative. Thus, we can
de¯ne Rm =
©
p2 2 P2;w 2 W;p2 ¸ w;D1 ¸ 0;D2 ¸ 0
ª
as the feasible area for the
manufacturer's problem.
Then manufacturer's problem can be formulated as below.
Vm = max
(p2;w)2Rm
©
fm(p2;w)
ª
(1.9)
In the above formulation, we assume the non-negativity of all prices and manufac-
turing cost c. We also assume that the prices are bounded. In the next section, we
focus on the solution and analysis of the problem.CHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 11
1.4 Solutions and analysis
In this section, we focus on obtaining the optimal solutions for the retailer's prob-
lem and manufacturer's problem. Sub-section 1.4.1 introduces the framework. Sub-
section 1.4.2 solves the retailer's problem, while Sub-section 1.4.3 discusses the man-
ufacturer's problem.
1.4.1 Introduction of the framework and sequential decision
When solving the problem, we use sequential decisions procedure. First we assume
that the direct price p2 and w are known and given for the retailer, under which
we solve the retailer's problem and obtain optimal retail price p¤
1. Note that p¤
1 is
a function of p2 and w. We then solve the manufacturer's problem and obtain the
optimal solutions p¤
2 and w¤ for the manufacturer. Plugging p¤
2 and w¤ back into
p¤
1, we can obtain the optimal solution for the retailer. Finally, we can obtain the
pro¯ts for retailer and manufacturer using the optimal prices obtained.
1.4.2 Solutions for retailer's problem
In this subsection, the retailer's problem is analyzed and solved. The retailer, acting
as Stackelberg follower, decides its retail price ¯rst given the manufacturer's whole-
sale price and direct channel price.
Given p2 and w, let fr(p1) = (p1 ¡ w)D1(p1;p2), we can obtain the retailer's maxi-
mum pro¯t Vr as below.
Vr(p2;w) = max
p12P1
©
fr(p1)
ª
(1.10)
s.t. p1 ·
a1 + b12p2
b11
:CHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 12
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Figure 1.2: Feasible region for retailer. Region R0: D1 > 0, w · p2, p2 · ¹ p2;
Line segment BC: D1 = 0.
Maximizing the pro¯t Vr is equivalent to maximize fr over p1 subjective to the
constraints of p1 ·
a1+b12p2
b11 . We can easily see that fr is concave over p1, given that
p2 and w are ¯xed and known. Set the ¯rst derivative to be zero, we can obtain the
optimal retail price as a function of p2 and w. That is p¤
1 =
a1+b11w+b12p2
2b11 .
Lemma 1.1. Given w and p2, ^ p1 maximizes fr
^ p1 =
a1 + b11w + b12p2
2b11
(1.11)
Lemma 1.1 illustrates the optimal pricing decision for the retailer without con-
sidering any constraints. That is ^ p1 is the retailer's optimal solution only when
^ p1 ·
a1+b12p2
b11 satis¯es. When p1 >
a1+b12p2
b11 , the retailer's optimal solution would be
a1+b12p2
b11 .
Area R0 is de¯ned as R0 =
©
0 · p1 · ¹ p1;0 · p2 · ¹ p2;0 · w · ¹ w;w ·
a1+b12p2
b11 ;w ·
p2
ª
. It's easy to verify that ^ p1 · ¹ p1 as long as w 2 W and p2 2 P2. Thus, R0
represents the feasible area of wholesale price w and direct price pd for the retailer's
problem. Figure 2 illustrates the feasible area R0 for the retailer's problem. Notice
that R0 includes all the boundaries of R0. If the manufacturer sets its wholesale
price too high such that D1 < 0, then the retailer's response would be p¤
1 =
a1+b12p2
b11 ,
which means the optimal retail price would fall on line segment BC. In fact, this
"optimal" retail price does not make any sense for the retailer because it does notCHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 13
generate any pro¯ts for the retailer. However, we de¯ne this price because we want
to use it to obtain the manufacturer's optimal solutions when the solutions are on
the boundary D1 = 0. We formally state the retailer's best pricing strategy in the
following theorem.
Theorem 1.1. (Retailer's Optimal Pricing Decision) Given the hotel's decision of
wholesale price w and direct channel price p2, the optimal retail price p¤
1 for the
retailer is
p
¤
1 =
8
> <
> :
a1+b11w+b12p2
2b11 if(p2;w) 2 R0;
Nofeasiblesolution otherwise:
Next, we solve the manufacturer's problem by ¯rst identifying the manufacturer's
feasible area Rh.
1.4.3 Manufacturer's problem
Knowing the retailer's best responses, the manufacturer's problem is to maximize
its total pro¯ts by choosing a proper wholesale price w and direct market price p2.
De¯ne fm(p2;w) as below
fm(p2;w) = (w ¡ c)D1 + (p2 ¡ c)D2 (1.12)
where D1 and D2 are as de¯ned in section 3.1. The manufacturer's pro¯t Vm can
then be obtained as below.
Vm = max
p2;w
©
fm(p2;w)
ª
(1.13)
s.t. D1 ¸ 0;D2 ¸ 0;p2 ¸ w;p2 · ¹ p2;w · ¹ p1:CHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 14
Thus manufacturer's problem is to maximize fm(p2;w) under the constraints listed
above. Notice that p1 represents function p1(p2;w) here. At ¯rst, we ignore all the
conditions and maximize fm(p2;w).
Lemma 1.2. Under assumption 2, fm(p2;w) is joint concave over the wholesale
price w and direct price p2. An unique solution p¤
2 and w¤ can be obtained to maxi-
mize fm(p2;w).
Proof and optimal prices are listed in Appendix A. The results in Lemma 1.2
maximize fm if we don't consider any constraints. However, there are several con-
straints to be considered when solving the manufacturer's problem. There are ¯ve
constraints for the manufacturer's problem: D1 ¸ 0, D2 ¸ 0, p2 ¸ w, p2 · ¹ p2,
w · ¹ p1.
Under these constraints, we can divide the manufacturer's problem into four dif-
ferent cases. Di®erent constraints correspond to di®erent problems. If one of the
constraints is violated, then the solutions will be on the boundaries. In this case, the
problem becomes a di®erent problem with only either direct channel or traditional
channel exists. Note that we de¯ne p2 = w as one of the boundary constraints for
manufacturer's problem and discuss the problem separately. This is di®erent from
the literature. In the literature, people often treat p2 · w as a constraint for man-
ufacturer (Chiang (2003)). However, in our paper, we discuss the manufacturer's
problem separately when p2 < w and p2 = w.
We de¯ne the manufacturer's feasible area Rh, as is illustrated in ¯gure 3 based on
the constraints. Given that the retailer's best responding price as p1 =
a1+b11w+b12p2
2b11 ,
we can obtain the manufacturer's feasible area Rh based on wholesale price w and
direct price p2. The ¯rst constraint to be considered is p¤
1 · ¹ p1. That is p¤
1 must
be within the boundary of p1, i.e. p¤
1 =
a1+b11w+b12p2
2b11 < ¹ p1. However, as long as
(p2;w) 2 R1, p¤
1 =
a1+b11w+b12p2
2b11 < ¹ p1 satis¯es.
The demand for the traditional channel must be non-negative, i.e. D1 ¸ 0, from
which we can obtain p1 ·
a1+b12p2
b11 . And from p¤
1 =
a1+b11w+b12p2
2b11 , we can obtainCHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 15
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Figure 1.3: Feasible region for manufacturer's problem. Region R1: D1 > 0,
D2 > 0, w < p2; Line segment AB: D1 ¸ 0, D2 > 0, w = p2; Line segment BC:
D1 = 0, D2 ¸ 0, w · p2; Line segment CD: D1 ¸ 0, D2 = 0, w < p2.
b11w · a1 + b12p2. Another constraint, D2 ¸ 0, together with p¤
1 =
a1+b11w+b12p2
2b11 ,
we can obtain (2b22b11 ¡ b21b12)p2 · 2a2b11 + a1b21 + b11b21w. In other words, this
retail price is optimal only when the manufacturer sets the direct channel price p2
and wholesale price w in region Rm, where Rm = f(p2;w)jb11w · a1 + b12p2;w ·
p2;(2b22b11 ¡ b21b12)p2 · 2a2b11 + a1b21 + b11b21w;w · ¹ p1;p2 · ¹ p2g. Notice that
when the values of wholesale price w and direct price p2 fall on the triangle area of
M BCE and M CDF, the solutions fall on the line segments BC and CD.
Here, we can then divide the manufacturer's problem into four di®erent cases based
on the boundary conditions or the constraints:
1. Consider the problem in the region Rh that does not include the boundaries, i.e.
the open area of region Rh. We de¯ne this area as R1 = f(p2;w)jb11w < a1 +
b12p2;w < p2;(2b22b11 ¡ b21b12)p2 < 2a2b11 + a1b21 + b11b21w;w < ¹ p1;p2 < ¹ p2g.
The solutions in this area are interior solutions of the problem. This is de¯ned
as Case 1 below. We will discuss this case later in this sub-section;
2. Consider the optimal prices that lies on line segments AB, BC and DE. These
correspond to three special cases. These three cases are discussed in sub-section
4.3. We rede¯ne and solve the problem separately when the solutions are on
the boundaries.CHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 16
We de¯ne the four cases for the manufacturer's problem as below:
Case 1.1. : (Regular case) (p2;w) 2 R1. When we solve the manufacturer's dual
channel problem below, we assume the condition (p2;w) 2 R1 hold. We call this case
as Regular case.
The manufacturer's problem can be formulated as below:
Vm = max
p2;w
©
fm(p2;w)
ª
(1.14)
s.t. D1 > 0;D2 > 0;p2 > w > 0;p2 < ¹ p2;w < ¹ p1:
Proposition below solves the manufacturer's problem when (p2;w) 2 R1 hold.
Proposition 1.1. p¤
1, p¤
2 and w¤ in Lemma 1.2 are optimal for the manufacturer
when (p¤
2;w¤) 2 R1 are satis¯ed.
Proposition 1.1 shows that when there is an interior solution, p¤
1, p¤
2 and w¤ in
Lemma 1.2 are the optimal solutions for the manufacturer and thus maximize the
manufacturer's pro¯t.
When one of these constraints is violated, we rede¯ne the problem and obtain its
optimal solutions. If the manufacturer's optimal prices w¤ and direct price p¤
2 is not
in R1, then the solutions must be on the boundaries. We de¯ne another three special
cases under which one of these constraints is violated.
Case 1.2. : (Equal pricing) w = p2. This case happens when the manufacturer
forces its pricing strategy to let the wholesale price equals to its direct channel price.
This case corresponding to the line segment AB in ¯gure 3.
Case 1.3. : (Single traditional channel) D1 > 0;D2 = 0. This case happens when
the manufacturer control the direct channel price p2 to ensure that there is no sales
for the direct channel. This case corresponding to the line segment DE in ¯gure 3.CHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 17
Case 1.4. : (Single direct channel) D1 = 0;D2 > 0. This case happens when the
manufacturer sets its wholesale price to su±cient high (higher than the retailer's
retail price) so that there is no demand for the traditional channel. This case corre-
sponding to the line segment BC in ¯gure 3.
Notice that the retailer's optimal solutions for case 1, case 2 and case 3 are
the same and is illustrated in Theorem ??. However, the optimal solutions for the
manufacturer for the three special cases listed in the above are di®erent. We will
discuss these three special cases in sub-section 1.4.3. The manufacturer's pro¯t can
be obtained by plugging p¤
1, p¤
2 and w¤ in Lemma 1.2 into the manufacturer's pro¯t
function:
Vm = (w
¤ ¡ c)(a1 ¡ b11p
¤
1 + b12p
¤
2) + (p
¤
2 ¡ c)n (1.15)
Similarly, the retailer's pro¯t can be obtained:
Vr = (p
¤
1 ¡ w
¤)(a1 ¡ b11p
¤
1 + b12p
¤
2) (1.16)
The results of Vr and Vm are listed in the Appendix A.
1.4.4 Solutions for boundary cases
In this subsection, we solve the dual channel problem when there is no interior
solution existing.
First, consider special case 3, where the wholesale price is very low compared with
the direct price and at the same time, the manufacturer shuts down the direct
channel. This case corresponds to the line segment CD.
Lemma 1.3. The prices on line segment CD are not optimal for the manufacturer.
The proof of Lemma 1.3 is given in the Appendix and the intuition is as follows.CHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 18
Because the direct price p2 has a dominant e®ect on the direct channel and its
e®ect on the direct channel is greater than that on traditional channel, thus when
we decrease the direct price, it brings more customers to the direct channel which
more than o®sets the number of customers decreases from the traditional channel.
In addition, from our assumption know that the direct price is no less than the
wholesale price, which means p2 ¸ w. Thus when we decrease the direct price
a little bit, the pro¯t generated from the direct channel would be able to o®set
the pro¯t lost from the traditional channel. Therefore, it is never optimal for the
manufacturer to shut down the direct channel and only keep the traditional channel.
It's quite common for the manufacturer to set its wholesale price equal to its direct
channel's retail price and this strategy has been discussed in many literatures and
proved to be an optimal pricing strategy for the manufacturer (Chiang et al. (2003)
and Cattani et al. (2006)). This strategy is also widely used in the industry, for
example Dell.
Retailer's problem. Let fr(p1) = (p1¡w)D1, then maximizing the retailer's pro¯t
is equivalent to maximize fr(p1) over p1.
Vr(p2;w) = max
p1
©
fr(p1)
ª
(1.17)
s.t. D1 > 0;D2 > 0;w = p2
Lemma 1.4 below gives us the optimal response of the retailer given wholesale price
w and direct price p2.
Lemma 1.4. Given b11 is non-negative, fr(p1) is concave over p1. Given thatCHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 19
(p2;w) 2 AB, the optimal retail price p¤
1 can be obtained as below.
p1(w;p2) =
a1 + b11w + b12p2
2b11
=
a1 + (b11 + b12)w
2b11
(1.18)
Proof. Setting the ¯rst order derivative of fr over p1 to zero, we can obtain the
optimal p¤
1. ¤
From Lemma 1.4, we can see that, the solution for the retailer is the same to the
solution obtained from dual channel problem with w < p2. That means the manu-
facturer's decision of whether or not to discriminately price the two channels does
not a®ect the retailer's pricing decision. Next, we solve the manufacturer's problem.
Manufacturer's problem. De¯ne fm(p2;w) = (w ¡ c)D1 + (p2 ¡ c)D2. Then,
maximizing manufacturer's pro¯t is equivalent to maximize fm(p2;w). The manu-
facturer's maximum pro¯t can be obtained as
Vm = max
p2;w
©
fm(p2;w)
ª
(1.19)
s.t. D1 > 0;D2 > 0;w = p2:
Given the retailer's pricing response in lemma 1.4, Lemma 1.5 below gives us the
optimal pricing decision for the manufacturer.
Lemma 1.5. Under Assumption 2, fm is concave on p2 and w. An unique optimal
w¤ can be obtained when the conditions of D1 > 0 and D2 > hold. The optimal
wholesale price w¤ and direct price p¤
2 is
w
¤ = p
¤
2 =
a1b11 + 2a2b11 + a1b21
2(b2
11 + 2b22b11 ¡ b11b21 ¡ b11b12 ¡ b21b12)
+
1
2
c (1.20)CHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 20
The corresponding retail price for the retailer is
p
¤
1 =
a1 + (b11 + b12)w¤
2b11
(1.21)
Please see the proof in the Appendix.
Next, we solve the problem with positive demand for the direct channel only, i.e.
D1 = 0 and D2 > 0. In order to ensure zero demand for the traditional channel,
we set the wholesale price p1 · w and p2 · ¹ p2. In this case, we solve the problem
for the manufacturer, while the retailer will not have any pro¯ts. Notice that this
problem corresponds to the line segment BC of Figure 2.
Manufacturer's problem. Let fm(p2) = (p2 ¡ c)D2 and D2 = a2 ¡ b22p2 + b21p1,
then the manufacturer's maximum pro¯t can be obtained
Vm = max
p2
©
fm(p2)
ª
(1.22)
s.t. D2 > 0;D1 = 0:
Lemma 1.6 below shows us the optimal pricing decision for the manufacturer when
the manufacturer operates only one direct channel.
Lemma 1.6. Under Assumption 2, fm is concave over p2. Under the condition of
¹ p1 < 2¹ p2 + c, the optimal direct channel price can be obtained
p
¤
2 =
1
2
¹ p2 +
1
2
c: (1.23)
The corresponding retail price is p¤
1 = 1
2¹ p1 +
a1+b12c
2b11 .
Plugging p¤
2 and p¤
1 into Vm, we can obtain the optimal pro¯t of the manufacturer
as Vm = (p¤
2 ¡ c)(a2 ¡ b22p¤
2 + b21p¤
1).CHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 21
1.4.5 Optimal solutions for the manufacturer's problem
In this subsection, we obtain an optimal solution for the manufacturer's problem and
propose an algorithm to solve the manufacturer's problem based on the discussions
of section 1.2 and 1.3.
The retailer's problem can be solved by Theorem ??, given manufacturer's decisions
of wholesale price w and direct price p2. From Theorem ??, the retailer's optimal
solution depends solely on the manufacturer's pricing decisions and is not a®ected
by the allocation decision for the direct channel. we summarize the manufacturer's
optimal decision under di®erent scenarios. From subsection 1.4.2 and 1.4.3, we can
obtain an algorithm to solve the manufacturer's problem under di®erent scenarios.
Algorithm 1.1. The manufacturer's problem can be solved by taking the following
steps:
1. Solve the manufacturer's problem according to the retailer's best response with-
out considering any constraints.
2. Examine the solutions obtained in step 1 to see if the solutions satisfy the con-
straints of the manufacturer's problem, i.e. examine interior solutions existing
or not.
3. If there are no interior solutions, then re-solve the problem using boundary
conditions.
4. If the parameters satisfy the constraints of more than two cases, use the solu-
tions that generates most pro¯ts for the manufacturer.
The manufacturer's problem can be solved by Algorithm 1.1. We formally state
the manufacturer's optimal pricing decision in the following theorem.
Theorem 1.2. The manufacturer's pricing decision can be solved using Algorithm
1.1.CHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 22
We have solved the four di®erent cases for the retailer and the manufacturer
and obtained solutions under di®erent scenarios. However, notice that there are
two special cases: the ¯rst case is that the wholesale price w equals to zero, i.e.
w = 0; the second case is that the direct price p2 equals to its upper bound price
¹ p2, i.e. p2 = ¹ p2. we can easily justify that these two cases are not optimal for the
manufacturer. For the ¯rst case, if the manufacturer sets wholesale price w = 0,
then the manufacturer would gain no pro¯t from the traditional channel. Thus it
would be more pro¯table for the manufacturer to set positive wholesale price, which
will bene¯t the manufacturer's direct channel due to channel competition. For the
second case, from sub-section 1.4.4, we have solved the case with zero demand for
direct channel, which actually identical to setting p2 = ¹ p2.
1.5 Price matching policy and centralized deci-
sion making
When opening a direct channel, it is common for the manufacturer to set its direct
price matching with retailer's retail price. For example, Dell company sells its com-
puters online at the same price as its retailer's retail price, i.e. p1 = p2. Such pricing
strategy is also discussed in the literature (Cattani et al (2006)). In addition, there
may cases that a company acts as a centralized decision maker and decides its selling
prices simultaneously for the direct channel and traditional channel without caring
the wholesale price. We call such kind of company "Integrated Firm". The inte-
grated ¯rm's performance is often used as a performance bench mark to compare
the performance of other pricing policies, i.e. dual channel, single channel, price
matching, etc. We solve these two cases in this section.CHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 23
1.5.1 Manufacturer matches its direct price with retail price
In this subsection, we will show how does the manufacturer's pro¯ts perform under
this strategy compared with the manufacturer setting its prices freely. When setting
p1 = p2 = p, we assume the format of demand function maintains same as D1 and
D2 as we de¯ne at the beginning: D1 = a1 ¡ b11p + b12p and D2 = a2 ¡ b22p + b21p.
There are two decision variables: one is the retail price p and the other is wholesale
price w. As the manufacturer commits to price-matching with the retail price, p is
decided by the retailer, while the manufacturer still optimally decides its wholesale
price w.
There is an upper bound for the retail price in order to satisfy the non-negativity
condition of demands, namely D1 ¸ 0 and D2 ¸ 0. The upper bound is de¯ned by
¹ p = maxf
a1
b11¡b12;
a2
b22¡b21g. Thus we de¯ne the feasible area for price p as P = fp · ¹ pg.
Next, we solve the problem following the above procedure. That is, we solve the
problem with the manufacturer and the retail playing a Stackelberg game: the
manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg leader, while the retailer acts as a follower.
Retailer's problem. De¯ning fmtr(p) = (p¡w)D1, we model the retailer's problem
as below.
Vmtr = max
p2P
©
fmtr(p)
ª
(1.24)
Notice that in the above formulation, we have assume the positivity of demand D1
and D2. If the either demand equals to zero, i.e D1 = 0 or D2 = 0, we would have
p =
a1
b11¡b12 or p =
a2
b22¡b21g, under each case we say the solutions of the problem
lay on the boundary. If p =
a2
b22¡b21, we know that the retailer sets her retial price
such that there is zero demand for the manufacturer's direct channel. In this case,
there is an implicit condition, i.e
a1
b11¡b12 >
a2
b22¡b21. If such condition does not satisfy,
there would not be any sales for both channels. We may imagine that this case
happens because the manufacturer wants to operate only retail channel, thus theCHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 24
manufacturer sets its wholesale price larger than the upper bound price of the direct
channel, i.e. w ¸
a2
b22¡b21.
If the retailer sets its retail price p =
a1
b11¡b12, it means that the manufacturer wants
to shut down the retail channel by setting a proper wholesale price w to force the
retailer to price the upper bound of the retail channel, i.e. w ¸
a2
b22¡b21. That also
means the manufacturer wants to gain his pro¯t solely from the direct channel.
For the case that the manufacturer wants to operate only single direct channel, it
does no longer make any sense for the manufacturer to 'match' its price. Instead,
the manufacturer would set its direct price optimally to maximize its own pro¯ts.
However, under such case, the direct price set by the manufacturer must be greater
than the upper bound price for the retail channel, i.e. p ¸
a1
b11¡b12. In this case,
there is also an implicit condition, namely
a1
b11¡b12 <
a2
b22¡b21. We would solve the the
problem later when the two special cases happen.
Solving the retailer's problem according to the retailer's objective function 1.24, we
can obtain the retailer's optimal retail price as below.
^ p =
a1
2(b11 ¡ b12)
+
1
2
w (1.25)
Manufacturer's problem. De¯ning fmtm = (p ¡ c)D2 + (w ¡ c)D1, the manufac-
turer's problem can be modeled as below.
Vmtm = max
w
©
fmtm(w)
ª
(1.26)
s.t. D1 > 0;D2 > 0:CHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 25
Solving the manufacturer's problem, we can obtain manufacturer's optimal wholesale
price as below.
w
¤ =
a1 + a2 ¡
a1(b22¡b21)
b11¡b12 + (b11 ¡ b12 + b22 ¡ b21)c
b11 ¡ b12 + 2(b22 ¡ b21)
(1.27)
The corresponding retail price can be obtained as
p
¤ =
3a1 + a2 + (b11 ¡ b12 + b22 ¡ b21)c
2(b11 ¡ b12 + 2(b22 ¡ b21))
(1.28)
The conditions under which the above solutions are optimal can be obtained as
below.
Constraint 1.1. (a1 ¡ b11c + b12c) ¸
a2(b11¡b12)¡a1(b22¡b21)
b11¡b12+2(b22¡b21) . This constraint can
guarantee the non-negativity of D1.
Constraint 1.2. p¤ < minf
a1
b11¡b12;
a2
b22¡b21g This constraint means that the prices
are bounded. This constraint also guarantee the non-negativity of the demand of the
direct channel.
If constraint 1.1 is violated, then we must have D1 = 0 which means w =
a1
b11¡b12.
In this case, the manufacturer sets its wholesale price high enough to shut down the
retail channel but optimally sets its direct price to maximize its pro¯t from direct
channel. The manufacturer's pro¯t can be obtained as below.
Vmtm = max
p f(p ¡ c)(a2 ¡ b22p + b21p)g (1.29)
s.t.
a2
b22 ¡ b21
> p ¸
a1
b11 ¡ b12
:
The optimal direct price can be obtained as p¤ =
a2+b22c¡b21c
2(b22¡b21) . The constraint for
this solution is
2a1
b11¡b12 ¡
a2
b22¡b21 · c <
a2
b22¡b21. Notice that in this case, the upper
bound price of the direct channel must be greater than that of traditional channel,CHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 26
i.e.
a2
b22¡b21 >
a1
b11¡b12.
When the manufacturer sets its wholesale price greater than the upper bound price
of the direct channel, i.e. w ¸
a2
b22¡b21, the retailer is forced to set its retail price
greater than
a2
b22¡b21 in order to be pro¯table. Under this case, the manufacturer
operates only traditional channel. In this case, the retailer's optimal response to the
manufacturer's wholesale price is still p =
a1
2(b11¡b12) + 1
2w. The manufacturer's pro¯t
in this case can be obtained as
Vmtm = (w ¡ c)(a1 ¡ b11p + b12p)
=
1
2
[¡(b11 ¡ b12)w
2 + (a1 + b11c ¡ b12c)w ¡ a1c] (1.30)
Vmtm is concave over w and we can obtain the optimal wholesale price as w¤ =
a1
2(b11¡b12) + 1
2c. The corresponding retail price would be p¤ =
3a1
4(b11¡b12) + 1
4c. The
condition for this case is
2a2
b22¡b21 ¡
a1
b11¡b12 · c <
a1
b11¡b12. Notice that in this case,
the upper bound price of the direct channel must be less than that of traditional
channel, i.e.
a2
b22¡b21 <
a1
b11¡b12
1.5.2 Should a vertically integrated ¯rm use the direct chan-
nel?
In many cases, we can expect to see some manufacturers selling through dual chan-
nels but having a centralized decision maker. In this case, we call the ¯rm as a
vertically integrated ¯rm (Chang et al (2003)). Obviously, the manufacturer cases
about its pro¯ts by deciding the retail price p1 and direct price p2 simultaneously.
The pro¯t for an integrated ¯rm can be formulated as below.
Let fvi = (p1 ¡ c)D1 + (p2 ¡ c)D2, then the ¯rm's pro¯ts equal
Vvi = max
(p1;p1)2(P1;P2)
©
fvi(p1;p2)
ª
(1.31)CHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 27
s.t. D1 ¸ 0;D2 ¸ 0
A vertically integrated ¯rm controls both traditional retailing and direct sales. Given
the formulation of 1.31, the manufacturer sets its retail price p1 and direct price p2
to maximize its own pro¯ts Vvi.
Maximizing Vvi with respect to p1 and p2 gives
p1 =
a2b12 + a2b21 + 2a1b22
4b11b22 ¡ b2
12 ¡ 2b12b21 ¡ b2
21
+
¡b2
12 + b12b22 ¡ b21b22 + 2b11b22 ¡ b12b21
4b11b22 ¡ b2
12 ¡ 2b12b21 ¡ b2
21
(1.32)
p2 =
a1b21 + a1b12 + 2a2b11
4b11b22 ¡ b2
12 ¡ 2b12b21 ¡ b2
21
+
¡b2
21 + b21b11 ¡ b12b21 + 2b11b22 ¡ b11b12
4b11b22 ¡ b2
12 ¡ 2b12b21 ¡ b2
21
(1.33)
This solution satis¯es only when the demands for both channels are positive, i.e.
D1 ¸ 0 and D2 > 0.
If either channel's demand is negative, we must have zero demand for that channel
and the problem becomes a di®erent one. When the demand for the traditional
channel is not positive, we will have
Vvi = max
(p1;p1)2(P1;P2)
©
fvi(p1;p2)
ª
(1.34)
s.t. D1 = 0;D2 ¸ 0
where fvi = (p2 ¡ c)D2.
With D1 = 0, we can reduce two variables into one variable p2 (we plug p1 =
a1+b12p2
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into Vvi). Maximizing Vvi with respect to p2 gives
p2 =
1
2
¹ p2 +
1
2
c (1.35)
This solution satis¯es only when the demand for the direct channel is positive, i.e.
D2 > 0. From the solution, we can obtain D2 =
b11b22¡b12b21
2b11 (¹ p2¡c), which is positive
given ¹ p2 > c. Alternatively, there may be only traditional channel having positive
demand while zero demand for direct channel. In such case, we can obtain the
optimal retail price p1 using p2 =
a2+b21p1
b22 to maximize Vvi.
p1 =
1
2
¹ p1 +
1
2
c (1.36)
This solution satis¯es only when the demand for the traditional channel is positive,
i.e. D1 > 0. From the solution, we can obtain D1 =
b11b22¡b12b21
2b22 (¹ p1 ¡ c). If the
parameters satisfy both dual channel setting as well as single channel setting, then
it is optimal for the manufacturer to select the strategy that generates most pro¯ts.
1.6 Numerical results and managerial insights
In this section, we provide some numerical study to illustrate some main results.
We ¯rst observe how the manufacturer and the retail's pro¯ts change when the
parameters a1, a2, b11, b12, b22, b21 change. Meanwhile, we also present how the
corresponding prices change with regards to the parameters. When examining the
market potential's e®ects, i.e. the e®ects of a1 and a2, we maintain the values of
b11, b12, b22, b21 unchanged and let b11 = b12 and b22 = b21. When we examine the
e®ects of b12 and b21 (or b11 and b22), we let a2 >> a1. We set the market potential
for direct channel much greater than that of traditional channel because we want to
see whether the manufacturer would abandon the traditional channel or not when
the direct channel is much more attractive for the customers.CHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 29
our results show that it's optimal for the manufacturer to operate dual channel most
of the time, even when the direct market is much greater than that of traditional
market. Our result shows some inconsistence with some results from some litera-
tures. Some literatures have shown that when the direct channel becomes a lot more
convenient than that of traditional channel, the manufacturer would abandon the
traditional channel and only operate single direct channel (Chiang et al. (2003) and
Cattani et al. (2006)).
Our results also show that when traditional market is greater than that of direct
market, it is optimal for the manufacturer use dual channel with p2 > w. This
pricing policy means that the manufacturer tends to give some pricing advantage
to the retailer in order to avoid channel con°icts. However, when the direct market
is greater than that of traditional channel, the manufacturer will price the direct
channel more aggressively and let the direct price equals to the wholesale price, i.e.
p2 = w. When the traditional market is extremely unpro¯table for the manufacturer
(even the manufacturer sets its wholesale price close to its manufacturing cost, there
is still very few customer buying from traditional channel), the manufacturer would
prefer to operate single direct channel.
1.6.1 Numerical study for a1 and a2
In this section, we present numerical study for market potential a1 and a2 under the
three cases. We set the parameters as below: b11 = b22 = 65, b12 = b21 = 25 and
c = 1. In order to simplify the illustration, we use case 1 to case 4 to denote the
following channel strategies for the following explanation:
Case 1 - Dual channel strategy for the manufacturer;
Case 2 - Dual channel strategy with pd = w;
Case 4 - Single direct channel strategy.
Remark 3: From Figure 4 to 5, we can see that, as a1 (from 0 to 300) and a2CHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 30
change (increase from 100 to 400), it is optimal for the manufacturer to choose dif-
ferent channel strategies.
It's optimal for the manufacturer to operate dual channels, unless the market base
for one channel is very small compared with the other channel. Even the direct
channel becomes very convenient for the customers, the manufacturer still betters
o® if he operates dual channels (not bandon the retail channel). This is consistent
with the industry and it may due to the brand awareness and advertisement e®ect
of the direct channel.
The manufacturer can gain more pro¯t operating dual channel with p2 > w than
using 'equal pricing' strategy (p2 = w) when a1 > a2. This is because the manu-
facturer needs to alleviate the channel con°icts between the two channels through
giving some advantage to the retailer regarding pricing. However, when the market
size of the direct channel is much greater than that of direct channel, i.e.a2 > a1,
the manufacturer would not give such pricing advantage to the retailer and choose
to price more aggressively (p2 = w), which in turn would bene¯t the retailer.
In addition, the manufacturer's and the retailer's pro¯t increase as a1 and a2 increase
which is easy to understand and intuitive.
1.6.2 Optimal pro¯t compared with the pricing matching
Table 1.2 shows how manufacturer's pro¯t changes comparing with the Pricing
Matching strategy and the centralized system when the market size for the tra-
ditional channel changes, i.e. a1 changes. Table 1.3 shows how manufacturer's pro¯t
changes comparing with the Pricing Matching strategy and the centralized system
when the market size for the traditional channel changes, i.e. a2 changes. Table
1.4 shows how manufacturer's pro¯t changes comparing with the Pricing Matching
strategy and the centralized system when b11 changes. Table 1.5 shows how man-
ufacturer's pro¯t changes comparing with the Pricing Matching strategy and the
centralized system when b22 changes. Table 1.6 shows how manufacturer's pro¯tCHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 31
Figure 1.4: Manufacturer's pro¯t Figure 1.5: Manufacturer's pro¯t
Figure 1.6: Retailer's pro¯t Figure 1.7: Direct price
Figure 1.8: Direct price - Wholesale price Figure 1.9: Direct price - Retail priceCHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 32
Table 1.2: Pro¯ts against a1 (with a2 = 400;b11 = b22 = 65;b12 = b21 = 25;c = 1)
Value Manufacturer's Pro¯ts Retailer's Pro¯ts Centralized %
a1 Our Equal Price Our Equal Price Company's Opt/
Model Pricing Matching Model Pricing Matching Pro¯t Cent
180 810.78 771.06 750.00 18.85 0.10 30.00 848.47 0.96
190 830.79 794.60 765.00 21.63 0.65 45.00 874.06 0.95
200 851.32 818.50 780.00 24.62 1.68 60.00 900.56 0.95
210 872.37 842.75 795.00 27.79 3.20 75.00 927.95 0.94
220 893.94 867.35 810.00 31.15 5.21 90.00 956.25 0.93
230 916.03 892.31 825.00 34.71 7.71 105.00 985.45 0.93
240 938.63 917.62 840.00 38.46 10.69 120.00 1015.56 0.92
250 961.75 943.29 855.00 42.40 14.16 135.00 1046.56 0.92
260 985.40 969.31 870.00 46.54 18.12 150.00 1078.47 0.91
270 1009.55 995.68 885.00 50.87 22.56 165.00 1111.28 0.91
280 1034.23 1022.41 900.00 55.38 27.49 180.00 1145.00 0.90
290 1059.43 1049.50 915.00 60.10 32.91 195.00 1179.62 0.90
300 1085.14 1076.93 930.00 65.00 38.81 210.00 1215.14 0.89
310 1111.37 1104.72 945.00 70.10 45.20 225.00 1251.56 0.89
320 1138.12 1132.87 960.00 75.38 52.08 240.00 1288.89 0.88
330 1165.39 1161.37 975.00 80.87 59.44 255.00 1327.12 0.88
340 1193.17 1190.22 990.00 86.54 67.29 270.00 1366.25 0.87
350 1221.48 1219.43 1005.00 92.40 75.63 285.00 1406.28 0.87
360 1250.30 1248.99 1020.00 98.46 84.45 300.00 1447.22 0.86
370 1279.64 1278.90 1035.00 104.71 93.76 315.00 1489.06 0.86CHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 33
Table 1.3: Pro¯ts against a2 (with a1 = 200;b11 = b22 = 65;b12 = b21 = 25;c = 1)
Value Manufacturer's Pro¯ts Retailer's Pro¯ts Centralized %
a2 Our Equal Price Our Equal Price Company's Opt/
Model Pricing Matching Model Pricing Matching Pro¯t Cent
150 180.002 180.002 123.75 34.546 34.55 56.528 231.2847222 0.78
160 196.678 196.678 140 32.425 32.43 60 247.2222222 0.79
170 214.093 214.093 157.083 30.372 30.37 63.194 264.0625 0.81
180 232.247 232.247 175 28.386 28.39 66.111 281.8055556 0.82
190 251.139 251.139 193.75 26.467 26.47 68.75 300.4513889 0.84
200 270.769 270.769 213.333 24.615 24.62 71.111 320 0.85
210 291.221 291.139 233.75 24.615 22.83 73.194 340.4513889 0.86
220 312.575 312.247 255 24.615 21.11 75 361.8055556 0.86
230 334.832 334.093 277.083 24.615 19.46 76.528 384.0625 0.87
240 357.991 356.678 300 24.615 17.88 77.778 407.2222222 0.88
250 382.054 380.002 323.75 24.615 16.36 78.75 431.2847222 0.88
260 407.019 404.065 348.333 24.615 14.91 79.444 456.25 0.89
270 432.887 428.866 373.75 24.615 13.53 79.861 482.1180556 0.90
280 459.658 454.406 400 24.615 12.22 80 508.8888889 0.90
290 487.332 480.684 427.083 24.615 10.97 79.861 536.5625 0.91
300 515.908 507.701 455 24.615 9.791 79.444 565.1388889 0.91
310 545.387 535.457 483.75 24.615 8.678 78.75 594.6180556 0.92
320 575.769 563.951 513.333 24.615 7.632 77.778 625 0.92
330 607.054 593.184 543.75 24.615 6.653 76.528 656.2847222 0.92
340 639.241 623.156 575 24.615 5.741 75 688.4722222 0.93
350 672.332 653.866 607.083 24.615 4.897 73.194 721.5625 0.93CHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 34
Table 1.4: Pro¯ts against b11 (with a1 = a2 = 600;b22 = 65;b12 = b21 = 25;c = 1)
Value Manufacturer's Pro¯ts Retailer's Pro¯ts Centralized %
b11 Our Equal Price Our Equal Price Company's Opt/
Model Pricing Matching Model Pricing Matching Pro¯t Cent
26 8032.5 8032.5 0 3290.6 3291 0 11325.74296 0.71
31 6618.04 6618.04 0 2193.9 2194 0 8864.73741 0.75
36 5684.93 5684.93 0 1539.9 1540 0 7336.948251 0.77
41 5016.26 5016.26 0 1117.8 1118 0 6296.352941 0.80
46 4508.91 4508.91 5050.36 830.5 830.5 58.414 5542.099894 0.81
51 4107.64 4107.64 3930.97 627.34 627.3 665.1 4970.403346 0.83
56 3780.18 3780.18 3264.64 479.57 479.6 886.14 4522.227612 0.84
61 3506.38 3506.38 2843.83 369.73 369.7 917.74 4161.51497 0.84
66 3273.18 3273 2566.16 295.91 286.7 853.24 3864.997613 0.85
71 3076.64 3070.93 2376.37 270.17 223 740.62 3616.988722 0.85
76 2910.8 2893.72 2242.61 247.86 173.8 605.79 3406.52752 0.85
81 2769.03 2736.64 2145.62 228.35 135.3 463.15 3225.724138 0.86
86 2646.49 2596.12 2073.32 211.13 105.1 320.78 3068.754532 0.86
91 2539.53 2469.46 2017.88 195.85 81.23 183.14 2931.225898 0.87
96 2445.39 2354.51 1974.13 182.19 62.37 52.615 2809.762467 0.87
101 2361.91 2249.58 1959.56 169.91 47.44 52.615 2701.727273 0.87
106 2287.39 2153.31 1945.95 158.82 35.63 52.615 2605.030527 0.88
111 2220.48 2064.58 1918.12 148.76 26.32 52.615 2517.994689 0.88
116 2160.08 1982.48 1880.86 139.59 19.03 52.615 2439.257592 0.88
121 2105.29 1906.23 1837.5 131.21 13.36 52.615 2367.701657 0.90
126 2055.38 1835.18 1790.35 123.51 9.026 52.615 2302.401355 0.89
131 2009.72 1768.79 1741.05 116.43 5.769 52.615 2242.58365 0.90
136 1967.82 1706.58 1690.72 109.89 3.397 52.615 2187.597839 0.90
141 1929.22 1648.15 1640.19 103.84 1.753 52.615 2136.892272 0.90
146 1893.56 1593.14 1590.01 98.22 0.706 52.615 2089.996193 0.91
151 1860.52 1541.24 1540.59 92.995 0.151 52.615 2046.505441 0.91
156 1829.82 0 1492.19 88.125 0 52.615 2006.071072 0.91
161 1801.23 0 1444.98 83.578 0 52.615 1968.390244 0.92
166 1774.55 0 1399.09 79.323 0 52.615 1933.198844 0.92
171 1749.6 0 1354.59 75.335 0 52.615 1900.265491 0.92CHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 35
Table 1.5: Pro¯ts against b22 (with a1 = a2 = 600;b11 = 65;b12 = b21 = 25;c = 1)
Value Manufacturer's Pro¯ts Retailer's Pro¯ts Centralized %
b22 Our Equal Price Our Equal Price Company's Opt/
Model Pricing Matching Model Pricing Matching Pro¯t Cent
26 10722.67 0.00 8190.00 301.54 0.00 0.00 11325.74 0.95
31 8261.66 0.00 7140.00 301.54 0.00 0.00 8864.74 0.93
36 6733.87 6163.55 6090.00 301.54 11.70 0.00 7336.95 0.92
41 5693.28 5402.47 5040.00 301.54 51.05 0.00 6296.35 0.90
46 4939.02 4797.96 5040.00 301.54 102.11 0.00 5542.10 0.89
51 4367.33 4306.26 3367.70 301.54 156.59 544.65 4970.40 0.88
56 3919.15 3898.55 2981.17 301.54 210.60 797.11 4522.23 0.87
61 3558.44 3555.05 2739.08 301.54 262.32 879.49 4161.51 0.86
66 3261.74 3261.74 2588.92 311.02 311.02 861.83 3865.00 0.84
71 3008.40 3008.40 2498.85 356.44 356.44 785.05 3616.99 0.83
76 2787.42 2787.42 2448.88 398.62 398.62 673.77 3406.53 0.82
81 2592.98 2592.98 2426.06 437.72 437.72 543.16 3225.72 0.80
86 2420.61 2420.61 2421.81 473.94 473.94 402.69 3068.75 0.79
91 2266.77 2266.77 2430.32 507.51 507.51 258.37 2931.23 0.77
96 2128.65 2128.65 2447.60 538.65 538.65 113.96 2809.76 0.76
101 2003.96 2003.96 2447.60 567.59 567.59 113.96 2701.73 0.74
106 1890.87 1890.87 2447.60 594.53 594.53 113.96 2605.03 0.73
111 1787.83 1787.83 2447.60 619.64 619.64 113.96 2517.99 0.71
116 1693.57 1693.57 2447.60 643.09 643.09 113.96 2439.26 0.69
121 1607.04 1607.04 2447.60 665.03 665.03 113.96 2367.70 0.68
126 1527.33 1527.33 2447.60 685.59 685.59 113.96 2302.40 0.66
131 1453.68 1453.68 2447.60 704.89 704.89 113.96 2242.58 0.65
136 1385.42 1385.42 2447.60 723.04 723.04 113.96 2187.60 0.63
141 1322.00 1322.00 2447.60 740.13 740.13 113.96 2136.89 0.62
146 1262.94 1262.94 2447.60 756.25 756.25 113.96 2090.00 0.60
151 1207.79 1207.79 2447.60 771.48 771.48 113.96 2046.51 0.59
156 1156.20 1156.20 2447.60 785.89 785.89 113.96 2006.07 0.58
161 1107.84 1107.84 2447.60 799.54 799.54 113.96 1968.39 0.56
166 1062.42 1062.42 2447.60 812.49 812.49 113.96 1933.20 0.55
171 1019.69 1019.69 2447.60 824.79 824.79 113.96 1900.27 0.54CHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 36
Table 1.6: Pro¯ts against b12 (with a1 = a2 = 600;b11 = b22 = 65;b21 = 25;c = 1)
Value Manufacturer's Pro¯ts Retailer's Pro¯ts Centralized %
b12 Our Equal Price Our Equal Price Company's Opt/
Model Pricing Matching Model Pricing Matching Pro¯t Cent
0 2549.96 2545.93 2027.89 150.06 123.60 210.15 2855.83 0.89
3 2624.55 2621.36 2061.08 163.11 137.98 292.77 2955.68 0.89
6 2703.13 2700.69 2099.85 177.26 153.84 377.35 3061.67 0.88
9 2786.01 2784.24 2145.62 192.62 171.34 463.15 3174.39 0.88
12 2873.54 2872.33 2200.20 209.33 190.66 549.12 3294.47 0.87
15 2966.10 2965.36 2265.93 227.53 212.03 633.73 3422.65 0.87
18 3064.12 3063.75 2345.89 247.41 235.70 714.85 3559.75 0.86
21 3168.09 3167.97 2444.15 269.18 261.94 789.44 3706.74 0.85
24 3278.56 3278.55 2566.16 293.06 291.10 853.24 3864.70 0.85
27 3396.09 3396.09 2719.39 323.57 323.57 900.11 4034.89 0.84
30 3521.26 3521.26 2914.16 359.79 359.79 921.23 4218.78 0.83
33 3654.84 3654.84 3165.09 400.31 400.31 903.67 4418.09 0.83
36 3797.68 3797.68 3493.43 445.74 445.74 828.15 4634.80 0.82
39 3950.80 3950.80 3930.97 496.84 496.84 665.10 4871.30 0.81
42 4115.32 4115.32 4527.09 554.50 554.50 367.67 5130.40 0.80
45 4292.58 4292.58 4527.09 619.79 619.79 367.67 5415.50 0.79
48 4484.10 4484.10 4527.09 694.00 694.00 367.67 5730.69 0.78
51 4691.68 4691.68 4527.09 778.73 778.73 367.67 6080.99 0.77
54 4917.41 4917.41 4527.09 875.90 875.90 367.67 6472.58 0.76
57 5163.78 5163.78 4527.09 987.91 987.91 367.67 6913.21 0.75
changes comparing with the Pricing Matching strategy and the centralized system
when b12 changes. Table 1.7 shows how manufacturer's pro¯t changes comparing
with the Pricing Matching strategy and the centralized system when b21 changes.
1.7 Conclusions and future research
In this paper, we have modeled a dual-channel problem with only one manufacturer
and one retailer considered. We have solved the manufacturer's pricing problem as
well as the retailer's pricing problem. Our results show that it is optimal for the
manufacturer to operate dual channels under some conditions, while it is optimal for
the manufacturer to sell its products only through one single channel, either direct
or traditional channel only, under some circumstances.CHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 37
Table 1.7: Pro¯ts against b21 (with a1 = a2 = 600;b11 = b22 = 65;b12 = 25;c = 1)
Value Manufacturer's Pro¯ts Retailer's Pro¯ts Centralized %
b21 Our Equal Price Our Equal Price Company's Opt/
Model Pricing Matching Model Pricing Matching Pro¯t Cent
0 1953.60 1953.60 2427.81 521.53 521.53 287.34 2855.83 0.68
3 2081.55 2081.55 2422.64 497.33 497.33 373.99 2955.68 0.70
6 2217.63 2217.63 2421.70 472.51 472.51 459.62 3061.67 0.72
9 2362.50 2362.50 2426.06 447.07 447.07 543.16 3174.39 0.74
12 2516.88 2516.88 2437.05 421.01 421.01 623.22 3294.47 0.76
15 2681.54 2681.54 2456.36 394.35 394.35 697.96 3422.65 0.78
18 2857.38 2857.38 2486.14 367.12 367.12 764.96 3559.75 0.80
21 3045.39 3045.39 2529.14 339.34 339.34 821.02 3706.74 0.82
24 3246.67 3246.67 2588.92 311.06 311.06 861.83 3864.70 0.84
27 3462.50 3462.47 2670.11 286.15 282.36 881.66 4034.89 0.86
30 3694.38 3694.20 2778.84 261.97 253.34 872.73 4218.78 0.88
33 3943.88 3943.46 2923.28 236.54 224.10 824.38 4418.09 0.89
36 4212.78 4212.06 3114.50 210.05 194.83 721.90 4634.80 0.91
39 4503.12 4502.09 3367.70 182.69 165.74 544.65 4871.30 0.92
42 4817.27 4815.92 3704.12 154.76 137.10 263.23 5130.40 0.94
45 5157.94 5156.32 4200.00 126.67 109.29 0.00 5415.50 0.95
48 5528.31 5526.48 4830.00 98.93 82.79 0.00 5730.69 0.96
51 5932.07 5930.13 5460.00 72.26 58.22 0.00 6080.99 0.98
54 6373.59 6371.66 6090.00 47.62 36.40 0.00 6472.58 0.98
57 6858.04 6856.25 6720.00 26.26 18.41 0.00 6913.21 0.99CHAPTER 1. DETERMINISTIC CASE 38
Di®erent channel settings for the manufacturer corresponds to di®erent pricing deci-
sions. There is always a feasible area for the pricing decisions made by the manufac-
turer and the retailer which consists of several boundaries. Our theoretical results
show that the optimal prices may fall on the boundaries under some conditions,
while there are interior solutions as well depending on the parameters of the model.
Our numerical results have also illustrated that the manufacturer optimizes its pro¯t
under di®erent channel setting and di®erent pricing decisions with di®erent values
of the parameters of our model.
Compared with other models used in the literature, our model is more general and
thus can explain most of the results obtained by other researchers. For example
Cattani et al.(2006) study a dual channel problem where a manufacturer with a
traditional channel partner opens up a direct channel in competition with the tra-
ditional channel, whose results show that equal-pricing strategy is optimal for the
manufacturer as long as the direct channel is signi¯cantly less convenient than the
traditional channel. Such equal pricing strategy can also been seen in our model
under speci¯c value of the parameters. Note that in Cattani's paper, equal-pricing
is optimal for the manufacturer (pd = w), while in our paper, the direct price pd can
be greater than wholesale price w, i.e. pd > w.
In addition, we have also discussed some interesting properties that have not been
examined in the literature. For example, we have showed the relationship between
the prices and the direct channel's demand n. Our results show that the prices are
linear with the direct channel's demand n, while the manufacturer's pro¯t is concave
over n and the retailer's pro¯t is convex over n. There exists an unique optimal n¤
that can optimize the manufacturer's pro¯ts. We have also obtained some structure
results based on n.
There are quite a few directions that can be extended to based on our models in this
paper. One possible direction would be to consider multiple retailers competing with
one manufacturer and multiple retailers competing with multiple manufacturers.Chapter 2
Stochastic Case
2.1 Introduction
Companies use the Internet as a new avenue to directly sell products to their cus-
tomers. While the Internet provides an opportunity to increase sales by attracting
more customers, it could also be a threat to the existing, traditional channel. The
problem of introducing a new direct channel to customers so that the overall sales of
a company is increased is called the dual-channel problem. In this paper, we study
the dual-channel problem in the manufacturer industry.
Dual-channel distribution systems are widely used in various industries. Manu-
facturers like Sony Ellectronics, Apple Computers, Dell, etc. sell products to the
consumers through independent retailers like Best Buy, Circuit City, etc. as well
as through their respective e-commerce web-site (direct channel). The sales volume
from the direct channel can be signi¯cant, especially when companies like Dell or
Apple are well-known to most customers and internet is accessible for more and
more consumers. More and more customers tend to buy their products from their
web-site not from the traditional store. For a company that operates two distribu-
tion channels, the ¯rst decision to make would be the "pricing" decision. That is,
what prices would be optimal for them to sell products through the two channels?
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Except for the "pricing" decision, inventory decision is another decision facing the
companies that operates two distribution channels. Inventory competition between
a manufacturer and its channel partner is inevitable under dual channel scenario.
How does the manufacturer allocate inventory to the competing channel members?
Does a manufacturer always favor its own channel? Some manufacturers, like Dell
and Apple maintain web-sites that can accept customer orders while selling through
retailers. For these companies, they need to decide how many should be allocated
to each channel.
Our motivation for this research came from our literature review of recent research
on dual channel problems. Balasubramanian (1998) modeled "the competition in
the multiple-channel environment from a strategic viewpoint" and marked "the early
attempt to analyze this issue" (direct versus retail competition). After Balasubra-
manian's early move on researching this multiple-channel problem, a lot of papers
regarding this area have been published. Most of them are dealing with the "pric-
ing" problem and the e®ects of direct marketing on the manufacturer and the retailer
(Chiang et al. 3003; Viswanathan 2005; Swaminathan et al., 2006 and 2009).
Aside from the "pricing" strategies for the manufacturer, the allocation problem
(Allocation here means the number of units allocated to the direct channel.) is also
important for the manufacturer. However, only a few papers address the pricing
and allocation problem at the same time (Tsay and Agrawal, 2004b; Mallik et al.
2006; Yao et al. 2009.).
In the manufacturing industry, more and more manufacturers selling through retail-
ers as well as its web-site. In this paper, we try to solve such dual-channel problem
in the manufacturing industry with one manufacturer and one retailer considered.
Our analysis characterizes the equilibrium of the Stackelberg game where the manu-
facturer, as the leader in the game, knows the pricing decision taken by the retailer
and decides its wholesale price to the retailer and direct price for the direct channel.
The demand we consider is stochastic.CHAPTER 2. STOCHASTIC CASE 41
Our work contributes to the operations management literature by attempting to
solve the manufacturer's pricing problem and the retailer's pricing problem under
stochastic demand case. We are also trying to obtain the optimal inventory level for
the manufacturer and optimal order quantity for the retailer, which has not been
solve in the literature under such a general model like ours. Our results so far show
that the prices (wholesale price w and direct price pd) are linear decreasing with n.
We are trying to obtain the optimal inventory level, which is n¤, and optimal order
quantity, which is z¤
0 for the manufacturer and the retailer.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a
review of the related literature. Section 2.3 presents problem analysis, assumptions
and our model as well as our main results. Section 2.4 provides some numerical
study, while section 2.5 summarizes and concludes the paper.
2.2 Literature review
Our work relates to two streams of literature in operations management: channel
con°ict and capacity allocation. We provide a brief review of the literature for each
of these two areas. As for channel con°ict, there are quite a lot of papers that are
closely related to our work.
Multi-channel problem has been extensively researched in the literature. Some of
them focus on the pricing problem with competition, while some of them focus on
demand forecasting and mixed-channel strategy with value-adding retailer.
Balasubramanian (1998) analyzed the competition between direct marketers and
conventional retailers through using the spatial setting of the circular market, which
considered the role of information as a strategic lever in the multiple-channel mar-
ket. Direct sellers can regulate the level of consumer information and control the
competitive °avor of the market. Tsay et al. (1999) and Frazier (1999) survey chan-
nel structure and incentive design for performance enhancement, but not channelCHAPTER 2. STOCHASTIC CASE 42
con°ict. Rhee and Park (2000) study a hybrid channel design problem, assuming
that there are two consumer segments: a price sensitive segment and a service sen-
sitive segment. Chiang et al. (2003) examine a price-competition game in a dual
channel supply chain. Their results show that a direct channel strategy makes the
manufacturer more pro¯table by posing a viable threat to draw customers away
from the retailer, even though the equilibrium sales volume in the direct channel is
zero. Their results however depend on the assumption that customer's acceptance
of online channel is homogeneous.
Boyaci (2004) studies stocking decisions for both the manufacturer and retailer and
assumes that all the prices are exogenous and demand is stochastic. Tsay and
Agrawal (2004) provide an excellent review of recent work in the area and exam-
ine di®erent ways to adjust the manufacturer-retailer relationship. Viswanathan
(2005) studies the competition across online, traditional and hybrid channels using
a variant of circular city model. His focus is on understanding the impact of dif-
ferences in channel °exibility, network externalities, and switching costs. Cattani
et al.(2006) study coordination of pricing on Internet and traditional channels by
modeling micro-level consumer behavior for demand generation. In their model, cus-
tomers are at a random physical distance from traditional retailers, and at a random
virtual distance from the direct marketer, independent of the physical distance. The
market then is segmented according to the utility each customer attains from either
the direct channel or the traditional channel. Customers are not excluded from a
speci¯c market; thus both markets have a chance to compete for all customers. Aus-
sadavut et al.(2006) studied a dual channel supply chain in which a manufacturer
sells to a retailer as well as to consumers directly. Consumers choose the purchase
channel based on price and service qualities. The manufacturer decides the price
of the direct channel and the retailer decides both price and order quantity. They
developed conditions under which manufacturer the manufacturer and the retailer
share the market in equilibrium. They also showed that the di®erence in marginalCHAPTER 2. STOCHASTIC CASE 43
costs of the two channels plays an important role in determining the existence of
dual channels in equilibrium.
Another two related papers are published in 2009 by Swaminathan et al.(2009) and
Hu et al. (2009). Swaminathan (2009) studied the optimal pricing strategies when
a product is sold on two channels. They provided theoretical bounds for the four
prevalent pricing strategies proposed in the paper. Hu et al. (2009) discussed the
revenue management for a service supply chain with two streams of customers, with
the supplier having limited capacity of a perishable product. Monotone properties
for the revenue functions and pricing strategies have been derived in this paper.
Another stream of literature that relates to our work is capacity allocation. Cachon
and Lariviere (1999b) consider a single supplier with limited capacity selling to sev-
eral retailers who are privately informed of their optimal stocking levels. They ¯nd
that supply chain might be better o® under an allocation mechanism that induces
retailers to in°ate orders. Deshpande and Schwarts (2002) consider a generalization
of the above model using both pricing and allocation mechanisms. Geng and Mallik
(2007) consider a supply chain involving one manufacturer and one independent
retailer. The manufacturer distributes her product to the end consumer through
the retailer as well as through her direct channel. Each of the two channels faces
a stochastic demand. They establish the necessary condition for a manufacturer to
undercut a retailer's order and show that a manufacturer may deny the retailer of
inventory even when the capacity is ample. Yao et al. (2009) study the strategic
inventory deployment for retail and e-tail stores. They also consider a supply chain
consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. Customers can purchase either from
the retailer or directly from the manufacturer via an e-tail channel. They study three
di®erent inventory strategies, namely centralized inventory strategy, a Stackelberg
inventory strategy, and a strategy where the e-tail operation is out sourced to a third
party logistics provider. Optimal inventory levels in retail and e-tail stores and the
respective expected pro¯ts have been obtained.CHAPTER 2. STOCHASTIC CASE 44
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Figure 2.1: Dual channels stochastic demand. A manufacturer sells its products
to customers through an retailer and through a direct channel. For each unit of
product sold through the retailer, the retailer charges the customer a price p1 and
pays the manufacturer a wholesale price w · p1. For each unit of product that is
sold directly from the manufacturer, the manufacturer charges the customer a direct
price p2.
Our model di®ers from the prior studies in the following areas: (i) We focus on
a general demand model to model the pricing problem for manufacturer and the
retailer. (ii) We study the optimal pricing decisions of the manufacturer and the
retailer under stochastic demand. In addition, we also try to obtain the optimal
inventory level for the manufacturer and optimal order quantity for the retailer.
2.3 Problem formulation
We introduce the assumptions and the model in this section. We divide the problem
into two sub-problems: the manufacturer's problem and the retailer's problem. As-
suming that the manufacturer and the retailer are playing a Stackelberg game with
the manufacturer being the leader and the retailer being the follower. We solve the
problem backwards. That is, we solve the retailer's problem ¯rst, after which the
manufacturer's problem is solved after obtaining the retailer's optimal response.
Figure 2.1 shows the dual channels of the manufacturer.
The problem can be further divided into two sub-problems: the retailer's problem
and the manufacturer's problem. Below, we ¯rst describe the retailer's problem and
its modeling. Then after that, we will describe the manufacturer's problem and
its modeling. In the following section, which is section 2.4, we will focus on theCHAPTER 2. STOCHASTIC CASE 45
Table 2.1: Notations for stochastic case
ai base demand for channel i (i = 1;2)
bij price sensitivity coe±cients (i;j = 1;2)
c manufacturing cost for one unit of product
pi retail price for channel i (i = 1;2)
p1(p2;w) retailer's pricing decision as functions of p2 and w
w wholesale price for one unit of product
Di demand function for channel i (i = 1;2)
¦m manufacturer's pro¯t
¦r retailer's pro¯t
N the manufacturer's inventory level
q1 the retailer's order quantity
f1 the density function for the traditional channel's demand
F1 the cumulated function for the traditional channel's demand
f2 the density function for the direct channel's demand
F2 the cumulated function for the direct channel's demand
solutions analysis and numerical study. We list the notations used in this paper as
below. where in above table, i = 1 represents the traditional channel and i = 2
represents direct channel, respectively. Notice that in the above notations, ai, bij
and c are all non-negative.
2.3.1 Assumptions and modeling
Demand functions are modeled as below. D1 and D2 denote the demand for tradi-
tional channel and direct channel respectively.
D1 = a1 ¡ b11p1 + b12p2 + ²1 (2.1)
and similarly, D2 can be expressed as
D2 = a2 ¡ b22p2 + b21p1 + ²2 (2.2)
Assumption 2.1. : we assume that p1, p2, and w are all non-negative and bounded.
Let P1 = f0 · p1 · ¹ p1g;P2 = f0 · p2 · ¹ p2g;W = f0 · w · ¹ wg, then P1;Rd;WCHAPTER 2. STOCHASTIC CASE 46
denote the price ranges. Note that we de¯ne ¹ w = minf¹ p1; ¹ p2g.
Assumption 2.2. : the price and cross-price sensitivity parameters have some re-
lationships that are viewed as common constraints in the literatures.
bii ¸ bij; where i;j = 1;2(i 6= j): (2.3)
2.3.2 Retailer's problem formulation and solutions
In this section, we are going to discuss the problem when the demand is stochastic.
We de¯ne the Demand function for the retailer as: D1(p1;p2;²1) = y1(p1;p2) +
²1. Alternatively, we de¯ne the demand function for the manufacturer from direct
channel as : D2(p1;p2;²2) = y2(p1;p2) + ²2. Speci¯cally, y1 and y2 are de¯ned as
y1(p1;p2) = a1 ¡ b11p1 + b12p2 and y2(p1;p2) = a2 ¡ b22p2 + b21p1. We de¯ne q1 as
the order quantity for the retailer. We assume that there is no salvage value for
the unsold rooms and the shortage cost incurred for the retailer is s. Also, we use
f1(¢) and F1(¢) to denote the density function and cumulative distribution function
of ²1, while f2(¢) and F2(¢) are used to represent the density function and cumulative
distribution function of ²2.
Then the pro¯t function for the retailer is as below:
¦r(q1;p1) =
8
> <
> :
p1D1(p1;p2;²1) ¡ wq1; D1(p1;p2;²1) · q1;
p1q1 ¡ wq1 ¡ s[D1(p1;p2;²1) ¡ q1]; D(p1;p2;²1) > q1
In order to make it more convenient to solve, we can change the expression by
de¯ning z1 = q1 ¡ y1(p1;p2) and substituting D1(p1;p2;²1) = y1(p1;p2) + ²1 into
the objective function of the above. (Ernst(1970), Thowsen(1975) and Data etCHAPTER 2. STOCHASTIC CASE 47
al.(1997)).
¦r(z1;p1) =
8
> <
> :
p1[y1(p1;p2) + ²1] ¡ w[y1(p1;p2) + z1]; ²1 · z1;
p1[y1(p1;p2) + z1] ¡ w[y1(p1;p2) + z1] ¡ s[²1 ¡ z1]; ² > z1
This transformation of variables provides an alternative interpretation of the stock-
ing decisions: if the choice of z1 is larger than the realized value of ²1, then leftovers
occur; if the choice of z1 is smaller than the realized value of ²1, then the shortages
occur. However, leftovers here have no value and thus not formulated. The corre-
sponding optimal stocking and pricing policy is to stock q¤
1 = y1(p¤
1) + z1 units to
sell at the unit price p¤
1, where z¤
1 and p¤
1 maximize expected pro¯t. See Data et al.
(1997).
The retailer's expected pro¯t is:
E[¦r(z1;p1)] =
Z z1
A
(p1[y1(p1;p2) + u])f1(u)du
+
Z B
z1
(p1[y1(p1;p2) + z1] ¡ s[u ¡ z1])f1(u)du
¡w[y1(p1;p2) + z1]: (2.4)
De¯ning ¤(z1) =
R z1
A (z1 ¡ u)f1(u)du and £(z1) =
R B
z1(u ¡ z1)f1(u)du,
we can write:
E[¦r(z1;p1)] = Ã(p1) ¡ L(z1;p1); (2.5)
where Ã(p1) = (p1 ¡w)[y1(p1;p2)+¹1], and L(z1;p1) = w¤(z1)+(p1 +s¡w)£(z1).
The objective is to maximize the retailer's expected pro¯t:
max
(z1;p1)2(1;P1)
©
E[¦r(z1;p1)]
ª
(2.6)CHAPTER 2. STOCHASTIC CASE 48
We can get the ¯rst and second partial derivatives of E[¦r(z1;p1)] taken with respect
to z1 and p1:
@E[¦r(z1;p1)]
@z1
= ¡w + (p1 + s)[1 ¡ F1(z1)]; (2.7)
@2E[¦r(z1;p1)]
@z2
1
= ¡(p1 + s)f1(z1); (2.8)
@E[¦r(z1;p1)]
@p1
= 2b11(p
0 ¡ p1) ¡ £(z1); (2.9)
@2E[¦r(z1;p1)]
@p2
1
= ¡2b11; (2.10)
where p0 =
a1+b11w+¹1+b12p2
2b11 . The term p0 denotes the optimal risk-less price, which
is the price that maximizes ¦(p1).
Lemma 2.1. For a ¯xed z1, the optimal price is determined uniquely as a function
of z1: p¤
1 ´ p1(z1) = p0 ¡
£(z1)
2b11
Then we can solve for optimal z1 by substituting p¤
1 = p1(z1) into the pro¯t
function, and the optimization problem becomes a maximization over the single
variable z1: maxz1 E[¦r(z1;p1(z1))].
From the ¯rst derivative of pro¯t function E[¦r(z1;p1(z1))] over z1, we can get the
below equation.
@E[¦r(z1;p1)]
@z1
= ¡w + (p
0 ¡
£(z1)
2b11
+ s)[1 ¡ F1(z1)]
= ¡w + (
a1 + b11w + ¹1 + b12p2
2b11
¡
£(z1)
2b11
+ s)[1 ¡ F1(z1)]
= ¡
1 + F1(z1)
2
w +
b12
2b11
[1 ¡ F1(z1)]p2
+[
a1 + ¹1 ¡ £(z1)
2b11
+ s][1 ¡ F1(z1)] (2.11)CHAPTER 2. STOCHASTIC CASE 49
Set the above equation into zero, we can solve for the optimal z1. However, similar to
what was introduced by Nicholas C. Petruzzi and Maqbool Dada 1999, demonstrates,
E[¦r(z1;p1(z1))] might have multiple points that satisfy the ¯rst-order optimality
condition, depending on the parameters of the problem. See Data (1997) for details.
Thus we have the following Theorem 2.
Theorem 2.1. : Given the manufacturer's direct price p2 and wholesale price w,
the single-period optimal stocking and pricing policy for the retailer is to stock q¤
1 =
y1(p¤
1)+z¤
1 units and sell at the unit price p¤
1, where p¤
1 is speci¯ed by Lemma 1 and
z¤
1 is determined according to the following:
1. If F1(¢) is an arbitrary distribution function, then search exhaustively over all
values of z1 in the region [A;B] will determine z¤
1.
2. If F1(¢) is a distribution function satisfying the condition 2r1(z1)2+cr1(z1) > 0
for A · z1 · B, where r1(¢) ´
f1(¢)
1¡F1(¢) is the hazard rate, then z¤
1 is the largest
z1 in the region [A;B] that satis¯es
dE[¦r(z1;p1(z1))]
dz1 = 0.
3. If the condition in (2) is satis¯ed, and a1 ¡b1(c1 ¡2s)+A > 0, then z¤
1 is the
unique z1 in the region [A;B] that satis¯es
dE[¦r(z1;p1(z1))]
dz1 = 0.
Proof. See the appendix B.
2.3.3 Manufacturer's problem formulation
In this section, we are going to solve the manufacturer's problem. In the above
section, we have assumed that p2 and w are ¯xed and known to the retailer, based
on which the retailer solves for its optimal ordering quantity q¤
1 and set its optimal
price p¤
1. Here we use their value to solve the manufacturer's problem and decide
the optimal price p2 and inventory capacity N.
The manufacturer's capacity is ¯xed and de¯ned as N. The manufacturer ¯rst deter-
mines its optimal inventory capacity N¤. After that, the manufacturer determinesCHAPTER 2. STOCHASTIC CASE 50
its optimal direct channel price p¤
2 for direct channel. However, we know that the
inventory capacity for the manufacturer equals to the total inventory allocated to
the retail channel and direct channel. Assuming that he manufacturer allocates q2
number of units to the direct channel, while selling number of q1 units to the retailer,
then we have N = q1 + q2. Thus, after obtaining total inventory capacity N¤, we
can obtain the optimal inventory allocation q¤
2 allocated to the direct channel using
q¤
2 = N¤ ¡ q¤
1.
The manufacturer's pro¯t consists of two parts: the pro¯ts from the retailer, and the
pro¯ts obtained through selling products directly to the customers. We can obtain
manufacturer's pro¯t as below:
¦m(N;p2) =
8
> <
> :
p2D2(p2;²2) ¡ cq2 + (w ¡ c)q1(p2); D2(p2;²2) · q2;
p2q2 ¡ cq2 + (w ¡ c)q1(p2); D2(p2;²2) > q2
where q2 = N ¡q1(p2). Notice that in the above, we use q1(p2) to represent retailer's
optimal order quantity obtained in Theorem 1.1 given manufacturer's direct price
p2. Then we can get the expected total pro¯t for the manufacturer as below:
E[¦m(p2;w)] = ¡Nc + wq1 + p2E[minfq2;D2g] (2.12)
Where,
E[minfq2;D2g] =
Z 1
0
(minfq2;D2g)f2(u)du
=
Z q2
0
D2f2(u)du +
Z B
q2
q2f2(u)du
= y2(p2)
Z q2
0
f2(u)du + q2[1 ¡ F2(q2)] +
Z q2
0
uf2(u)du
= (a2 ¡ b22p2 + b21p1)F2(q2) + q2[1 ¡ F2(q2)] +
Z q2
0
uf2(u)du: (2.13)CHAPTER 2. STOCHASTIC CASE 51
The objective function thus can be transformed into:
E[¦m(p2;w)] = ¡Nc + wq1 + p2E[minfq2;D2g]
= (w ¡ c)q1 ¡ cq2 + p2E[minfq2;D2g]
= ¡Nc + wq1 + p2(a2 ¡ b22p2 + b21p1)F2(q2) + p2q2[1 ¡ F2(q2)]
+p2
Z q2
0
uf2(u)du (2.14)
From the discussion of retailer's problem, we know that the objective function of
retailer's pro¯t E[¦r(z1;p1)] satis¯es ¯rst order condition over z1. Thus, we can
obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2.1. From the discussion of retailer's problem, given z1 as the optimal
solution to the retailer's problem, then we can obtain
w =
b12[1 ¡ F1(z1)]
b11[1 + F1(z1)]
p2 +
[1 ¡ F1(z1)]
b11[1 + F1(z1)]
[a1 + ¹1 ¡ £(z1)] (2.15)
From Lemma 2.1 and 2.15, assuming ¹1 = 0, that we can obtain w = [1 ¡
F1(z1)]p1. Plugging it back to p1(z1) of Lemma1, we can obtain
p1 =
a1 + b12p2 ¡ £(z1)
b11[1 + F1(z1)]
(2.16)
2.4 Solutions for manufacturer's problem
In this section, we will analyze the dual channel problem and solve the manufac-
turer's problem. For the previous section, we have solved the retailer's pricing
problem, which is p1, given the manufacturer's pricing decisions, i.e. wholesale price
w and direct price p2. After that, in Theorem 2.1, we have proposed a solution to
solve for the retailer's optimal order quantity given w and p2.CHAPTER 2. STOCHASTIC CASE 52
Next, we solve the manufacturer's problem following the below procedure. There
are two decision variables left in the manufacturer's problem, i.e. the direct price
p2 and manufacturer's inventory capacity N. Notice that in our paper, we use a
trick to transform the problem and change these two decision variables into direct
price p2 and manufacturer's capacity level N according to Corollary 2.1. According
to Corollary 2.1, we can use z1 to represent wholesale price w. Plug w, obtained in
Corollary 2.1, into the manufacturer's objective function, we can now consider z1 as
¯xed and known and then solve for manufacturer's optimal capacity N¤ and direct
price p¤
2. We use sequential decision making procedure to solve for optimal N¤ and
p¤
2 in this section.
First, we solve for the optimal N¤ for the manufacturer given direct channel price
p2. After we obtain the optimal value N¤ as a function of p2, we then solve for the
optimal direct price p¤
2.
2.4.1 Obtaining the optimal inventory capacity N¤
We have obtained the simpli¯ed objective function for the manufacturer as below.
E[¦m(N;p2)] = ¡Nc + wq1 + p2E[minfq2;D2g]
= (w ¡ c)q1 ¡ c(N ¡ q1) + p2E[minfN ¡ q1;D2g] (2.17)
Observing the above objective function, we can ¯nd out that the manufacturer's
pro¯t consists of two parts: the ¯rst part is the pro¯t from selling through the
traditional channel, which is (w ¡ c)q1; the second part of pro¯t is from selling
through the direct channel, which is ¡c(N ¡ q1) + p2E[minfN ¡ q1;D2g]. We use
E¦t and E¦d to denote the two parts of pro¯ts, respectively, as below.
E¦t = (w ¡ c)q1 (2.18)CHAPTER 2. STOCHASTIC CASE 53
E¦d = ¡(N ¡ q1)c + p2E[minfN ¡ q1;D2g] (2.19)
It's easy to verify that E¦t is convex in p2 given z1. And E¦d is actually a joint
decision News-vendor problem with decision variables of N ¡ q1 and p2, which is
very similar to the retailer's problem. We thus use sequential decision to obtain the
optimal solutions.
We ¯rst obtain manufacturer's optimal capacity N¤, which is a function of p2. After
that, we plug N¤ into the manufacturer's objective function to obtain optimal direct
price p2. This procedure to solve the problem is di®erent from solving the retailer's
problem. The method in solving the retailer's problem is introduced by Zabel (1970)
and is used by Data (1998). The method of ¯rst solving for the optimal value of
N¤ as a function of p2 and then substituting the result back to E¦d is introduced
by Whitin (1955). Both sequential procedures yield the same results. However, in
order to simplify the problem, we use the Whitin's method to solve the problem.
Given wholesale price w and direct price p2, we can ¯nd that the pro¯t generated
from the ¯rst part is not a®ected by N. The second part of the pro¯t is actually
a News-vendor problem for the direct channel. We can then obtain the ¯rst order
condition as below.
@E[¦m(N;p2)]
@N
= ¡c + p2Pro(D2 > N ¡ q1) (2.20)
From the ¯rst order condition, we can obtain the optimal N¤ as below.
Theorem 2.2. Given p2, the manufacturer's optimal inventory level N¤ can be
obtained as below
N
¤ = F
¡1
2 (
p2 ¡ c
p2
) + q1 + y2: (2.21)
Notice that in the above, F
¡1
2 denotes the inverse cumulative distribution func-
tion of D2, which is de¯ned as F2(¢) in the beginning of this section.CHAPTER 2. STOCHASTIC CASE 54
2.4.2 Obtaining the optimal direct price p¤
2
we use Whitin's (1955) method obtain the optimal direct price p¤
2 in this subsection.
However, due to complexity of the problem, there is no closed form solution of p2.
De¯ning z2 as z2 = N¤ ¡ (z1 + y1) ¡ y2, then we can obtain optimal direct price p¤
2
in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1. Given z1, the optimal direct price p¤
2 can be determined according
to the following:
1. If F2(¢) is an arbitrary distribution function, then p¤
2 can be obtained by ex-
haustively searching the region [A;B].
2. If F(¢) is a distribution function satisfying the condition 2r2(z2)2 +
dr2(z2)
dz2 > 0
for A · z2 · B, where r2(¢) = f2(¢)=[1 ¡ F2(¢)] is hazard rate, then p¤
2 is the
largest p2 in the region [A;B] that satis¯es @E[¦m(p2)]=@p2 = 0.
Notice that in the above solution, we have obtained all the prices, i.e. retail
price p1 and direct price p2, as functions of z1. In addition, according to Lemma
2.21, we can also obtain optimal N¤ as a function of z1. And from Corollary 2.1, we
know that z1 is corresponding one-to-one with wholesale price w. Thus, given any
wholesale price w, we can obtain unique optimal direct price p¤
2 and manufacturer's
inventory capacity N¤. After that, we can then obtain optimal z¤
1 and optimal retail
price p¤
1.
From the ¯rst-order condition of direct channel price p2, we can obtain the following
corollary.
Corollary 2.2. According to Proposition 2.1, we have @E[¦m(p2)]=@p2 = 0. ThusCHAPTER 2. STOCHASTIC CASE 55
we have the following equation.
@E[¦m(p2)]
@p2
= y2 +
(p2 ¡ c)(b12b21 ¡ b11b22[1 + F1(z1)])
b11[1 + F1(z1)]
+
b12[1 ¡ F1(z1)](y1 + z1)
b11[1 + F1(z1)]
+
b12F1(z1)(w ¡ c)
1 + F1(z1)
¡ £2(z2)
= 0 (2.22)
where £2(z2) =
R B
z2(u ¡ z2)f2(u)du.
2.5 Numerical analysis for z1
We will include some numerical experiments here for the stochastic case. Due to
the complexity of the problem, we cannot obtain the optimal safety stock for the
retailer (note that we have changed decision variable wholesale price w into z1 using
Corollary 2.1). However, we know that the wholesale price is exogenous in a lot of
industries. In these industries, for example mining industry, manufacturers cannot
change their wholesale price too much. The wholesale price is given according to the
market. Thus, from this perspective, we have solved the whole problem for these
industries with exogenous wholesale price.
From ¯gure 2.2 and ¯gure 2.3, we can see that manufacturer's pro¯t is convex over
z1, which means an unique optimal z¤
1 that can maximize manufacturer's pro¯t may
not exist. Thus, we use numerical analysis to observe the behavior of z1 and how
manufacturer's pro¯t changes with regards to retailer's safety stock z1.
For Figure 2.2, the parameters are as below: a1 = 200;a2 = 450;b11 = b22 =
6:5;b12 = b21 = 2:5;c = 1;¾1 = 10. For Figure 2.3 parameters are: a1 = 200;a2 =
50;b11 = b22 = 6:5;b12 = b21 = 2:5;c = 1;¾1 = 100.
From ¯gure 2.2 and ¯gure 2.3, we can see that manufacturer's pro¯t is convex
over retailer's safety stock z1.CHAPTER 2. STOCHASTIC CASE 56
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2.6 Conclusions and future research
We conclude the dual channel problem considering stochastic demands in this sec-
tion. For the stochastic demand problem, we not only need to consider the pricing
problem faced by the manufacturer and the retailer, but also need to consider the
inventory control problem face by the manufacturer and the retailer. There are four
decision variables in our model: the production capacity of manufacturer, the order
quantity of retailer, the retail price o®ered by the retailer, and the direct channel
price o®ered by the manufacturer. We have developed a mechanism based on the
chain rule to obtain the solutions one by one for these variables. Notice that we
consider the wholesale price as exogenous.
Given the selling price in direct channel, the retailer can decide the order quantity
and the selling price in the traditional channel, which is similar to the News-vendor
problem (Petruzzi and Dada 1998). Meanwhile, The manufacturer can determine
the capacity for the direct channel which is similar to the News-vendor solution.
Given the retailer's pricing and order quantity decisions as well as the manufac-
turer's capacity decision, we have obtained the selling price for the direct channel.
In the second part of this thesis, I have solved the joint pricing and inventory control
problem in dual-channel network with one manufacturer and one retailer, consider-
ing wholesale price as exogenous. To the best knowledge of mine, there is no papers
talking about the joint pricing and inventory control decisions in a dual channel
network. I have also done some numerical analysis to see how manufacturer's pro¯t
changes with regards to the retailer's safety stock z1. In the numerical analysis, we
can see that the manufacturer's pro¯t is convex over retailer's safety stock z1, which
indicates that an unique z¤
1 that can optimize the manufacturer's pro¯t.
For future research, there are several directions. For example, our model can be
extended to multiple retailers ordering from multiple manufacturers while manufac-
turers selling directly simultaneously.Bibliography
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Proof of deterministic case
Proof of dual-channel case with positive demands
for both channels
Below, we prove the results obtained in Lemma 1.1, Lemma 1.2, Theorem 1.1,
and Proposition 1.1.
Proof. The retailer's problem:
fr(p1) = (p1 ¡ w)(a1 ¡ b11p1 + b12p2)
= ¡b11p
2
1 + (a1 + b11w + b12p2)p1 ¡ (a1 + b12p2)w (A.1)
Thus, fr is concave over p1 given b11 > 0. Setting the ¯rst order derivative to zero,
we can obtain
p
¤
1 =
a1 + b11w + b12p2
2b11
(A.2)
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Proposition 1 follows.
Manufacturer's problem:
fm(p2;w) = (w ¡ c)(a1 ¡ b11p1 + b) + (p2 ¡ c)(a2 ¡ b22p2 + b21p1)
= ¡
1
2
b11w
2 +
1
2
(a1 + b11c ¡ b21c)w +
1
2
(b12 + b21)wp2 (A.3)
+
2a2b11 + 2b11b22a1b21 ¡ b11b12c ¡ b12b21c
2b11
p2 ¡
(a1b11 + 2a2b11 + a21)c
2b11
We can obtain ¢ =
@2fm
@w2 ¢
@2fm
@p2
2 ¡ [ @2Vm
@p2@w]2 · 0 under assumption 2. Thus fm is
concave over w and p2. Setting the ¯rst derivative of p2 and w, respectively, to
zero, we can obtain the optimal wholesale price w¤ and p¤
2 as below.
w
¤ =
¡b2
12b21 + 2b12b11b22 + b2
21b12 ¡ b2
12b11 ¡ 2b21b11b22 ¡ 3b12b21b11 + 4b2
11b22
b11(8b11b22 ¡ b2
12 ¡ 6b21b12 ¡ b2
21)
c
+
2a2b11b21 + 2a2b11b12 + 4a1b11b22 + b2
21a1 ¡ a1b12b21
b11(8b11b22 ¡ b2
12 ¡ 6b21b12 ¡ b2
21)
(A.4)
p
¤
2 =
a1b21 + 2b11a2
2b11b22 ¡ b12b21
¡
2b11
2b11b22 ¡ b12b21
n
¤ +
b11b21
2b11b22 ¡ b12b21
w
¤
=
(b11b21 + 4b11b22 ¡ 3b21b12 ¡ b12b11 ¡ b2
21)c + 4a2b11 + 3a1b21 + a1b12
8b11b22 ¡ b2
12 ¡ 6b21b12 ¡ b2
21
(A.5)
The corresponding retail price for the traditional channel can be obtained
p
¤
1 =
2b2
11b22 ¡ b11b12b21 ¡ b11b22b21 + 3b11b22b12 ¡ 2b2
12b21 ¡ b11b2
12
b11(8b11b22 ¡ b2
12 ¡ 6b21b12 ¡ b2
21)
c
+
6a1b11b22 + a2b11b21 + 3a2b11b12 ¡ 2a1b12b21
b11(8b11b22 ¡ b2
12 ¡ 6b21b12 ¡ b2
21)
(A.6)
However, in order to make sure that both the traditional channel and direct
channel have positive demand, we must have D1 > 0 and D2 > 0, which in turn
can be obtained as the constraints for the dual-channel problem.APPENDIX A. PROOF OF DETERMINISTIC CASE 64
Proof of Lemma 1.3
Proof. For case 3, we know that D2 = a2 ¡ b22p2 + b21p1 = 0. Assuming that w
and p2 are on line segment CD, then we have D1 > 0. From Theorem 1 we can
obtain retailer's best response as p1 =
a1+b11w+b12p2
2b11 and the manufacturer's pro¯t
as Vm = (w ¡ c)D1.
If the manufacturer maintains wholesale price w unchange but reduces the direct
price by ±, then we have: p0
2 = p2 ¡ ±, and p0
1 = p1 ¡
b12
2b11±. Thus, we can obtain
D0
1 = a1¡b11p0
1+b12p0
2 = D1¡
b12
2 ± and D0
2 = a2¡b22p0
2+b21p0
1 = D2+(b22¡
b12b21
2b11 )±.
Thus we can obtain the manufacturer's pro¯t as below:
V
0
m = (w ¡ c)D
0
1 + (p
0
2 ¡ c)D
0
2
= (w ¡ c)(D1 ¡
b12
2
±) + (p2 ¡ c ¡ ±)(D2 + (b22 ¡
b12b21
2b11
)±)
= (w ¡ c)D1 + (p2 ¡ c)D2 ¡ ±D2 + (p2 ¡ c)(b22 ¡
b12b21
2b11
)±
¡
b12
2
(w ¡ c)± ¡ o(±
2) (A.7)
Because D2 = 0 and o(±2) = 0, we have V 0
m = Vm+(p2¡c)(b22¡
b12b21
2b11 )±¡
b12
2 (w¡c)±
It's easily to obtain V 0
m ¸ Vm from assumption 2 (the dominance assumption) and
p2 ¸ w.
Proof of Lemma 1.5
Proof. Here, we prove the results obtained for the case with pd = w. Let
fr(p1) = (p1 ¡ w)D1(p1;p2)
= ¡b11p
2
r + (a1 + b11w + b12p2)p1 ¡ (a1 + b12p2)w (A.8)APPENDIX A. PROOF OF DETERMINISTIC CASE 65
Thus, fr is concave over p1 given b11 > 0. Setting the ¯rst order derivative to zero,
we can obtain the optimal retail price as below
p
¤
1 =
a1 + b11w + b12p2
2b11
(A.9)
Let
fm(w) = (w ¡ c)D1 + (p2 ¡ c)D2
= (w ¡ c)(a1 ¡ b11p1 + b12p2) + (p2 ¡ c)(a2 ¡ b22p2 + b21p1)(A.10)
Taking the second order derivative of fm over w and using w = p2, we can obtain
fm(w) is concave over w under assumption 2. Taking the ¯rst order derivative
over w and setting it equal to zero, we can obtain the optimal wholesale price w¤
and the corresponding p¤
1 as below.
p
¤
1 =
a1 + b11w¤ + b12w¤
2b11
=
¡b11b2
12 ¡ 2b12b21b11 + 2b12b11b22 ¡ b21b2
11 + 2b2
11b22 + b3
11 ¡ b21b2
12
4b11(2b11b22 ¡ b12b11 + b2
11 ¡ b21b12 ¡ b21b11)
(A.11)
+
4a1b11b22 + 2b12b11a2 ¡ b12b21a1 ¡ b12b11a1 ¡ b11b21a1 + 3b2
11a1 + 2b2
11a2
4b11(2b11b22 ¡ b12b11 + b2
11 ¡ b21b12 ¡ b21b11)Appendix B
Proof of stochastic case
Proof of Theorem 2.1
Proof. From the equation 1.7, we have:
@E[¦r(z1;p1)]
@z1
= ¡w + p1[1 ¡ F1(z1)]: (B.1)
To obtain the values of z1 that satisfy this ¯rst-order optimality condition, we
de¯ne: R1(z1) ´ dE[¦(z1;p1(z1))]=dz1 and consider the zero points of R1(z1):
dR1(z1)
dz1
=
d
dz1
[
dE[¦r(z1;p1(z1))]
dz1
]
= ¡
f1(z1)
2b11
2b11p
0 ¡ £1(z1) ¡
1 ¡ F1(z1)
r1(z1)
(B.2)
where r1(¢) ´ f1(¢)=[1 ¡ F1(¢)] denotes the hazard rate.
d2R1(z1)
dz2
1
= [
dR1(z1)
dz1
]
df1(z1)
dz1
¡
f1(z1)
2b11
¢f[1 ¡ F1(z1)] +
f1(z1)
r1(z1)
+
[1 ¡ F1(z1)[dr1(z1)=dz1]]
r1(z1)2 g (B.3)
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Thus, we can obtain,
d2R1(z1)
dz2
1
jdR1(z1)=dz1=0 = ¡
f1(z1)[1 ¡ F1(z1)]
2b11r1(z1)2 f2r1(z1)
2 +
dr1(z1)
dz1
g (B.4)
If F(¢) is a distribution satisfying the condition 2r1(z1)2+
dr1(z1)
dz1 > 0, then if follows
that R1(z1) is monotone or unimodal, implying that dE[¦(z1;p1(z1))]=dz1 = 0 has
at most two roots.
Proof of Corollary 2.1
Proof. From Theorem 2.1, we know that the retailer's pro¯t function satis¯es ¯rst
order condition, i.e.
@E[¦r(z1;p1)]
@z1 = 0. Thus we can obtain:
¡
1 + F1(z1)
2
w + [b12p2 + a1 + ¹1 ¡ £(z1)]
[1 ¡ F1(z1)]
2b11
= 0 (B.5)
Re-arrange the terms in the above, we can obtain the equation in Corollary.
Proof of Theorem 2.21
Proof. From the equation 2.1, we have:
@E[¦m(N;p2)] = (p2 ¡ c)y2 ¡ c
Z z2
A
(z2 ¡ u)f2(u)du
¡(p2 ¡ c)
Z B
z2
(u ¡ z2)f2(u)du + (w ¡ c)(y1 + z1) (B.6)
where y2 = a2 ¡ b22p2 + b21p1, y1 = a1 ¡ b11p1 + b12p2 and z2 = q2 ¡ y2.
De¯ne N = q1 + q2, then instead of solving for optimal N¤, we can solve forAPPENDIX B. PROOF OF STOCHASTIC CASE 68
optimal z¤
2. Given w and p2, we can obtain,
@E[¦m(N;p2)]
@z2
= ¡cF2(z2)] + (p2 ¡ c)[1 ¡ F2(z2)]
= ¡c + p2[1 ¡ F2(z2)]: (B.7)
@2E[¦m(N;p2)]
@z2
2
= ¡p2f2(z2): (B.8)
Given z2, we can obtain,
@E[¦m(N;p2)]
@p2
= y2 + (p2 ¡ c)(¡b22 +
b12b21
b11[1 + F1(z1)]
) ¡
Z B
z2
(u ¡ z2)f2(u)du
+(y1 + z1) ¢
b12[1 ¡ F1(z1)]
b11[1 + F1(z1)]
+ (w ¡ c)(b12 ¡
b12
1 + F1(z1)
) (B.9)
@2E[¦m(N;p2)]
@p2
2
=
2b12
b11[1 + F1(z1)]
(b21 ¡ b11)
¡
2b12F1(z1)
b11[1 + F1(z1)]
[b11 ¡ b12 + b12F1(z1)] (B.10)
Thus, we can see that given z2, E[¦m(N;p2)] is concave in p2 and vice versa.
Given p2, setting the ¯rst order condition equal to zero, we can obtain,
z
¤
2 = F
¡1
2 (
p2 ¡ c
p2
) (B.11)
Thus, we can obtain N¤ = y2 + y1 + z1 + F
¡1
2 (
p2¡c
p2 ).APPENDIX B. PROOF OF STOCHASTIC CASE 69
Proof of Proposition 2.1
Proof. From the equation 2.1, we have:
@E[¦m(N;p2)] = (p2 ¡ c)y2 ¡ c
Z z2
A
(z2 ¡ u)f2(u)du
¡(p2 ¡ c)
Z B
z2
(u ¡ z2)f2(u)du + (w ¡ c)(y1 + z1)(B.12)
where y2 = a2 ¡ b22p2 + b21p1, y1 = a1 ¡ b11p1 + b12p2 and z2 = q2 ¡ y2.
From the proof of Theorem 2.3, given z2, we can have,
@E[¦m(N;p2)]
@p2
= y2 + (p2 ¡ c)(¡b22 +
b12b21
b11[1 + F1(z1)]
) ¡
Z B
z2
(u ¡ z2)f2(u)du
+(y1 + z1) ¢
b12[1 ¡ F1(z1)]
b11[1 + F1(z1)]
+ (w ¡ c)(b12 ¡
b12
1 + F1(z1)
) (B.13)
From Theorem 2.3, we have N¤ = y2 +y1 +z1 +F
¡1
2 (
p2¡c
p2 ). Plugging N¤ into the
manufacturer's pro¯t function, we can reduce two decision variables into single
decision variable p2.
De¯ne R2(p2) = @E¦m
@p2 , we can obtain,
@R2(p2)
@p2
= (¡b22 +
b12b21
b11[1 + F1(z1)]
) +
b12b21 ¡ b11b22[1 + F1(z1)]
b11[1 + F1(z1)]
(B.14)
+
b12[1 ¡ F1(z1)]
b11[1 + F1(z1)]
(b12 ¡
b12
1 + F1(z1)
) +
b2
12F1(z1)[1 + F1(z1)]
b11[1 + F1(z1)]2
+(1 ¡
p2 ¡ c
p2
)[F
¡1
2 (
p2 ¡ c
p2
)]
0
=
2b12b21 ¡ 2b11b22[1 + F1(z1)]
b11[1 + F1(z1)]
+
2b2
12F1(z1)[1 ¡ F1(z1)]
b11[1 + F1(z1)]
+
c2
p3
2f2(
p2¡c
p2 )APPENDIX B. PROOF OF STOCHASTIC CASE 70
De¯ne r2(¢) =
f2(¢)
1¡F2(¢), we can obtain,
@2R2(p2)
@p2
2
= c
2 ¢ [p
3
2f2(
p2 ¡ c
p2
)]
0
= c
2 ¢ [p
3
2f2(z2)]
0
=
c2
[p2
2f2(z2)]2[2f2(z2) +
cf0
2(z2)
p2(f2(z2))
]
= ¡
c2
p4
2f2(z2)r2
2(z2)
[2r
2
2(z2) +
dr2(z2)
dz2
] (B.15)
Thus, we can see that R2(z2) is unimodal in z2, ¯rst increasing then decreasing.
Therefore, given that 2r2
2(z2) +
dr2(z2)
dz2 > 0, E¦m(p2;N(p2)) reaches its maximum
at the unique value of p2 that satis¯es
dE[¦m(N(p2);p2)]
dp2 = 0.